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Abstract
The ongoing softwood lumber trade dispute between the United States (U.S.) and
Canada is one of the most contentious and largest bilateral trade battles over the recent
decades. The bilateral trade debate is mostly because of the different forestland ownership
systems in the U.S. and Canada, and the alleged timber subsidies by provincial governments
to Canadian lumber producers. The Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA) 2006 between the
U.S. and Canada is the latest transitory solution of this dispute, entailing Canada to impose
mandatory export charges on its lumber shipments to the U.S. In order to understand this
trade dispute from a strategic policy perspective, this study analyzes SLA 2006 using game-
theoretic frameworks. A Cournot-Nash duopoly model is developed to assess the possible
effects of the export tax on overall lumber price and production of softwood lumber in
both countries. The empirical econometric models are estimated to uncover the findings
of the Cournot-Nash duopoly model by employing the historical time-series data of the
softwood lumber market. Even though the game-theoretic model suggests that the export
tax under SLA 2006 could decrease Canadian lumber exports to the U.S., the empirical
estimation reveals that SLA 2006 is quite ineffective in restricting the lumber trade between
the two countries. This study also develops a two-country two-stage game, and concludes
that the optimum export tax under the framework of SLA 2006 is mainly determined by
the level of Canadian lumber production costs and the U.S. lumber production capacity.
Unlike the actual export tax of 0-15%, the empirical estimation reveals that the monthly
optimal export tax ranges from -23% to 30%. Given that SLA 2006 is scheduled to expire in
October 2015 and that both countries already started looking for ways forward, this study





1.1 Softwood Lumber Market in Canada and the United States
Canada has 348 million hectare of forests, which represent 9% of the world’s forests,
and 24% of the world’s boreal forests (Natural Resources Canada 2014). The forestry
sector in Canada contributes substantially to the domestic employment and gross domestic
product, and provides a wide range of social and environmental benefits. The solid wood
products particularly softwood lumber and structural panels industry represent the largest
share of the forest product industry in Canada.
As one of the major producers and exporters of softwood lumber in the world, the Cana-
dian lumber industry exports a large portion of its production to foreign markets. In terms
of the international forest product trade, Canada accounted for the world’s largest forest
product trade balance of C$19.3 billion in 2013 (Natural Resources Canada 2014). Besides
Canadian domestic consumption, the key destinations for Canadian softwood lumber are
the United States (U.S.) followed by overseas markets specifically China and Japan.
Figure 1.1 presents the annual quantity of Canadian lumber shipments, and its exports
to the U.S. and overseas markets. Over the last 25 years, the annual average quantity of
softwood lumber production in Canada has been around 27 billion board feet (bbf) with
the maximum quantity of 36 bbf in 2005 and the lowest production of 20 bbf in 2009. As
Figure 1.1 depicts, Canada exports a major portion of its softwood lumber production to
the U.S. with an annual average quantity of 15 bbf. The amount of the Canadian lumber
shipments to the U.S. was trending upward in the early 2000s and reached its peak of 22
bbf in 2005. Besides the U.S., overseas markets are key destinations for Canadian softwood
lumber. Over the last five years, lumber exports to Asian markets particularly China and
Japan have grown remarkably, which significantly influences a century-long U.S.-Canada
softwood lumber trade. In 2013, Canada shipped more than 5 bbf of softwood lumber to
overseas markets (Figure 1.1).
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Figure 1.1: Annual Canadian softwood lumber shipments, and exports to the U.S. and
overseas (Data source: Random Lengths)
Like Canada, the U.S. is also rich in forest resources, which cover 766 million acres of
the land (Oswalt et al. 2014). Softwood lumber is a key forest product which represents the
largest share of the industrial production in the U.S. Figure 1.2 reports the annual regional
softwood lumber production in the U.S. over the last three decades. The U.S. South is
a major softwood lumber producing region along with the inland and coastal regions of
the U.S. West. The U.S. had a significant amount of domestic lumber production with an
annual average of over 30 bbf during the late 1980s and 1990s. The lumber production
reached a peak of 38 bbf in 2005 right before the housing market bust, and dropped to
around 22 bbf during the great financial crisis of 2008-09. In the recent years, the U.S.
domestic softwood lumber production has increased, yet the annual production is well below
the production level of the early 2000s (Figure 1.2).
Even though the U.S. is the largest lumber producer in the world, its domestic lumber
production is not sufficient to satisfy the entire U.S. lumber demand. More than 95% of the
U.S. softwood lumber imports come from Canada, which represents roughly one-third of the
2
Figure 1.2: Annual regional softwood lumber production in the U.S. (Data source: Random
Lengths)
total U.S. consumption (Random Lengths 2014). The U.S. also imports small quantities
of softwood lumber from European countries such as Sweden and Germany, and Latin
American countries such as Chile and Brazil. Figure 1.1 specifically depicts the historical
trend of the U.S. lumber imports from Canada.
1.2 The Softwood Lumber Trade Dispute
The ongoing softwood lumber trade dispute between the U.S. and Canada is one of the
largest and most contentious trade battles in international trade history. The underlying
causes behind this decades-long bilateral trade dispute include the public ownership of for-
est land in Canada, and alleged timber subsidies by provincial governments to Canadian
lumber producers (Lindsey et al. 2000). Unlike in the U.S. where 58% of the forests are
owned by the private sector (Oswalt et al. 2014), almost 94% of the Canadian forests are un-
der the ownership of federal and provincial governments (Natural Resources Canada 2014).
Further, U.S. lumber producers argue that provincial governments in Canada provide sub-
sidies to the lumber industries in harvesting the standing timber, and that subsidized
Canadian lumber exports are dumped in the U.S. Canadian provincial governments deter-
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mine the stumpage price administratively rather than through a competitive auction bid
(Zhang 2007). The governments set the stumpage price based on the non-market approach,
and employ a variety of formulas to determine the province-specific timber harvesting fees
(Lindsey et al. 2000; Rahman and Devadoss 2002). The difference in softwood timber re-
source endowments between the two countries is another main cause of this dispute (Zhang
2007). The softwood lumber inventories in Canada remarkably outweigh the total softwood
growing stock in the U.S. (Random Lengths).
Softwood lumber trade between the U.S. and Canada is an important inter-country
political issue, as billions of dollars are transacted in the lumber trade each year. The
complexity of this trade issue is mainly explained by interest group politics and institutional
arrangements (Zhang 2007). Major players involved in the softwood lumber trade in the
U.S. are lumber producers (including timber producers), consumers (home builders and
home buyers) and the U.S. federal government (Zhang 2007). On the Canadian side, lumber
producers and federal and provincial governments are major players in this trade battle. In
the political bargaining and lobbying process, U.S. lumber producers are a small but well-
organized and active group. They have formed a group consisting of lumber producers from
the U.S. West, South and Northeast called the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports–currently
The U.S. Lumber Coalition– which has been very active in trade negotiation and political
lobbying since 1982 (Random Lengths 2015). However, the Canadian lumber industry is
fragmented and not well-organized at the provincial levels. The lack of consistent and
united position of Canadian provincial governments to deal with the trade issue also helps
extend the dispute without a permanent solution.
In order to resolve the trade dispute, there have been several temporary bilateral agree-
ments between the two countries including the five-year Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) for the period of 1987-1991, the Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA) 1996 for the
period of 1996-2001, and SLA 2006 for the period of 2006-2015. The SLA 2006 is the latest
transitory agreement between the U.S. and Canada to limit Canadian lumber exports to the
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U.S. It is a price-driven ad-valorem export tax rate coupled with a quota system. According
to the agreement, Canada has to apply the measures of either Option A or Option B in
the softwood lumber exports to the U.S. Option A is solely an export charge ranging from
0-15% of the prevailing monthly price; whereas option B is an export charge of 0-5% com-
bined with a volume restraint (Table 1.1). Alberta and British Columbia provinces choose
the option A, and other lumber producing provinces such as Manitoba, Saskatchewan, On-
tario and Quebec choose option B of the agreement. Alberta and British Columbia are
the major lumber-producing provinces in Canada. As explained in Table 1.1, the rate of
Canadian export tax depends on the prevailing monthly price. The free trade of softwood
lumber prevails if the prevailing monthly price is more than $US 355 per thousand board
feet. The export tax and/or volume restraint is a function of prevailing monthly price; the
higher the price of lumber, the less (or no) barriers to lumber exports to the U.S.
Table 1.1: U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement 2006: Export charge and export
charge plus volume restraint
Lumber Option A (AB and BC) Option B (MB, SK, ON and QC)-
price* -Export tax as a Export tax as a % of price,
% of price with export allocation
Over $US355 No export charge No export charge and no volume restraint
$US336-355 5% 2.5% export charge + regional share of 34%
of U.S. Consumption
$US316-335 10% 3% export charge + regional share of 32%
of U.S. Consumption
$US315 15% 5% export charge + regional share of 30%
or under of U.S. Consumption
*Four-week average of Random Lengths Framing Lumber Composite price (Source: SLA
2006)
The prevailing monthly price, as defined in the SLA 2006, is a four-week weighted
average of the Random Lengths (RL) Framing Lumber Composite price available three
weeks before the beginning of the month to which the prevailing monthly price will be
applied. The RL Composite price is a weighted index of 15 framing lumber price series in the
U.S. and Canada. The index which is comprised of 33% Southern Pine prices, 33% Western
U.S. prices and 34% Canadian lumber prices, measures the price movement in the overall
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lumber market. Figure 1.3 presents the monthly RL Framing Lumber Composite price
throughout the period of the SLA 2006. The price index remained below $315 until late
2012, hence Canadian lumber producers paid 15% export tax for their lumber shipments
to the U.S. Since late 2012 (except in June-August 2013), because the lumber composite
price is above $355, free trade prevails, and Canada has not collected any export duties on
its exports to the U.S.
Figure 1.3: Random Lengths Framing Lumber Composite Price compared with SLA 2006
duty/quota trigger prices (Data source: Random Lengths)
1.3 Dissertation Overview
The main purpose of this dissertation is to examine the effects of SLA 2006 on the
softwood lumber trade between the two countries under game-theoretic frameworks. This
dissertation also determines the optimal level of export tax under the framework of the SLA
2006. Besides game-theoretic analyses, this study also estimates the U.S.-Canada softwood
lumber market by employing historical monthly data from the softwood lumber market.
While several past studies have analyzed the U.S.-Canada softwood lumber dispute, none
of them specifically assessed the strategic effects of past agreements on softwood lumber
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production in the two countries. Despite several rounds of temporary negotiations and
agreements between the U.S. and Canada, both countries are unable to solve this trade
issue permanently. Given that the SLA 2006 is scheduled to expire in October 2015, interest
groups in both countries already started looking for ways forward. Canada is reported to
favor extending the SLA 2006, but the U.S. counterparts are against the continuation of the
current agreement (Campbell Global 2014). Under these circumstances, this dissertation
sheds light on the decades-long trade issue, and provides useful information to both parties
in country-level bargaining and trade negotiations.
The dissertation is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter provides a brief
introduction to the softwood lumber production and the historical trend of the softwood
lumber trade between the two countries. Chapter 2 briefly summarizes the historical events
associated with the softwood lumber dispute during the modern era. It also explains every
bilateral agreement and litigation process during that period. Then, chapter 3 extensively
reviews past research studies on the softwood lumber market and the trade dispute.
Chapter 4 develops a two-player Cournot-Nash equilibrium model to analyze the effects
of the export tax on softwood lumber production in both countries, profits of both U.S. and
Canadian firms, and the overall softwood lumber price under the framework of the SLA
2006. The theoretical results are consistent with traditional trade theories: an export tax
leads to higher overall lumber prices, more U.S. domestic production and greater profits of
U.S. lumber companies, but decreases Canadian lumber shipments to the U.S. and their
profit level. All results hold true in the case of a linear inverse demand equation, hence the
theoretical results are robust.
Chapter 5 estimates demand and supply equations for the U.S. softwood lumber market
using the monthly historical time-series data during the period of SLA 2006. Notwithstand-
ing the theoretical results in chapter 4, the results of the Limited Information Maximum
Likelihood (LIML) approach reveals that the effects of the export tax on the softwood
lumber trade is minimal. The estimated coefficient of export tax in the model of Canadian
7
exports supply to the U.S. is statistically insignificant. Further, the Canadian overseas
exports play an important role in the U.S.-Canada softwood lumber trade.
Likewise, chapter 6 develops a two-stage two-player game to examine the optimal level
of the export tax under the framework of SLA 2006. The results suggest that lumber
production costs in Canada, U.S. lumber production capacity, and linear demand param-
eters determine the optimal rate of export tax. The empirical estimation reveals that the
monthly optimal export tax during the SLA 2006 period ranges widely from -23% to 30%.
Chapter 7 presents the summary and conclusions of the dissertation.
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Chapter 2
A Historical Overview of the Softwood Lumber
Dispute
The softwood lumber trade between the United States and Canada has witnessed fre-
quent contentious battles over the last two centuries. The first ever lumber tariff of five
percent against the Canadian lumber shipments to the U.S. was reported to be placed in
1789 (Reed 2001). The modern version of the conflict erupted since early 1980s, and we
primarily focus here on the battle during this period. Reed (2001) provided a detailed his-
tory of the dispute prior to the 1980s; and Zhang (2007) described in detail events of more
recent decades. Based on the chronological development in this trade issue, the softwood
lumber trade dispute in the modern era has been classified into four periods: Lumber I to
Lumber IV (Reed 2001; Rahman and Devasoss 2002; Zhang 2007).
2.1 Lumber I
During the period between the mid 1970s and mid 1980s, Canadian softwood lumber
imports rose sharply by about 136% and captured about one-third of the U.S. lumber mar-
ket (Buongiorno et al. 1988). The increasing Canadian share in the early 1980s diminished
the competitive position of the U.S. domestic lumber industry. In response, U.S. lumber
producers alleged that the Canadian provinces, particularly British Columbia, Alberta,
Ontario and Quebec, unfairly subsidized their lumber industry through the administrative
policies which facilitated Canadian lumber firms to harvest timber from public forest lands
at a nominal stumpage fee. In 1982, U.S. producers from the U.S. West, South, and North-
east formed a lobbying group, the Coalition for Fair Canadian Lumber Imports (CFCLI).
It filed a petition with the U.S. Department of Commerce(DOC) and U.S. International
Trade Commission (ITC) asking for a countervailing duty (CVD) of 65% on Canadian
lumber imports (Zhang 2007). So started the trade dispute between these two countries
in the modern era. CFLI posited four arguments to support their claim of material injury
from Canadian imports: a rapid rise in the market share of Canadian lumber in the U.S.,
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a decline in domestic sawmill capacity and employment, a reduction in the profitability of
the U.S. lumber industry, and falling U.S. real lumber prices (Myneni et al. 1994). After
a full investigation of the allegation in May 1983, the International Trade Administration
(ITA) of the DOC rejected the petition stating that the amount of subsidies was less than
0.5% (Rahman and Devadoss 2002; Zhang 2007). The DOC also concluded that the Cana-
dian system of setting the stumpage price did not vary substantially from the U.S. pricing
system, and in some cases the Canadian prices were higher (Zhang 2007). DOC’s ruling
was challenged by CFCLI at the U.S. Court of International Trade, but the Court upheld
the DOC’s decision (Lindsey et al. 2000).
2.2 Lumber II: The Memorandum of Understanding
Despite failing in its petition in 1983, U.S. lumber producers asked the U.S. ITC again
in 1986 to conduct another Section 322 investigation based on a 1985 court decision about
the definition of an industry (Zhang 2007). The ITC found that major costs for Canadian
lumber producers were lower than those in the U.S., and later ruled that the Canadian
lumber imports injured the domestic lumber market. In the meantime, the CFCLI was
able to politicize the issue effectively, and started lobbying for trade restriction measures
against the Canadian lumber imports. While several formal and informal bilateral talks
between the U.S. and Canadian governments were intensifying to solve this trade issue,
the Coalition filed its petition again in 1986, requesting a 27% CVD on Canadian lumber
shipments to the U.S. As a preliminary ruling, the ITA of DOC found that Canadian
lumber industry was subsidized, and announced a 15% interim duty as a trade sanction on
Canadian lumber imports in October 1986. However, Zhang (2007) stated that the method
of stumpage fee calculation used by DOC was contrary to economic theory, and suffered
from several theoretical and empirical flaws.
Before a final ruling on the import tariff duty of 15% in December 1986, Canada sped
up the negotiation process with the U.S. counterparts and proposed to place a 15% export
tax instead. Although the Coalition of U.S. lumber producers wanted a higher rate of
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CVD, they also decided to settle on a 15% export tax because of high legal fees, lack of
supporting data, as well as risk and uncertainty that the DOC ruling might get overruled
in the court (Zhang 2007). Both parties reached an agreement and signed a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU). The MOU was a five-year bilateral trade agreement between the
U.S. and Canada, starting from January 1987. It required Canada to impose 15% export
duties on lumber shipments to the U.S. The MOU transferred the collection mechanism of
the proposed CVDs by the U.S. (importer) to the export tax by Canada (exporter). The
primary goal of the MOU was to reduce the Canadian market share of the U.S. lumber
market by increasing the price of Canadian lumber in the U.S. market. As expected, the
Canadian share of the U.S. market dropped to 25% from 33% in the five years of the
agreement (Myneni et al. 1994).
The MOU also provisioned that the Canadian provinces could reduce and/or eliminate
the rate of export tax by increasing their prevailing stumpage fees. Eventually, this option
of stumpage fee adjustment in the MOU turned out to be an underlying reason of escalating
the debate between the two countries throughout the period of MOU. British Columbia
(B.C.) government, immediately after the implementation of the MOU, raised the stumpage
fees by revising the residual approach in calculating stumpage fees (Zhang 2007). The B.C.
government led to increase annual stumpage and other forest fees by $100 million from $580
million, and stopped collecting the export tax from December 1987. Likewise, Quebec’s
government also adjusted their stumpage fee, and reduced the rate of export tax to 6.2%
(Random Lengths 2014). Later in 1988, as the B.C. government lowered its stumpage price
in Prince George region of the province, the U.S. Coalition of lumber producers alleged that
the B.C. government violated the MOU, and started intensifying the trade debate again.
Moreover, since all four major lumber producing provinces in Canada increased the level
of stumpage and other fees, and also changed their forest management policies, they were
against the MOU and they started lobbying for a change or termination of the MOU.
Despite some economic benefits from the MOU, the Canadian government unilaterally
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terminated the MOU on October 1991, because of the increasing lumber demand, provincial
politics and province-federal dynamics (Zhang 2007).
2.3 Lumber III: The Softwood Lumber Agreement 1996
Right after the termination of the MOU by Canada, the U.S. reacted immediately by
imposing self-initiated provisional import duties on Canadian exports to the U.S. under the
provision of Section 301 of the Trade Act 1974. A duty of 15% was imposed on lumber from
most of the provinces except B.C. (Random Lengths 2014). The U.S. trade representative
(USTR) investigated and found that forest management programs in Canadian provinces,
and log export restrictions from Canadian forests were countervailable subsidies (Rahman
and Devadoss 2002). Likewise, ITC found that Canadian imports injured the U.S. industry.
In March 1992, citing the subsidies in stumpage programs and log export restrictions, the
ITA of the Department of Commerce made a preliminary ruling that there would be a
provisional ad valorem duty of 14.48% on Canadian lumber imports from all provinces
except the Maritimes and a few small firms. It was reduced, however, to a permanent rate
of 6.51%, which was later approved by the ITC voting in June 1992.
Strongly disagreeing with the U.S. imposition of the CVD, Canada filed one appeal
under the terms of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and two other
appeals against the U.S. claims of subsidy and injury under the terms of the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (Random Lengths 2014). The GATT panel issued a report
supporting the U.S. action of self-initiation of the investigation, but the report stated that
the U.S. improperly imposed interim duties prior to a preliminary investigation of subsidy
and injury (Zhang 2007). The GATT panel also recommended the U.S. to refund the cash
collected when the bonding requirements were in effect.
A bi-national panel of dispute settlement procedures under Chapter 19 of FTA (the
FTA subsidy panel hereafter) was appointed to investigate the U.S. allegation of Canadian
subsidies, and another bi-national panel (the FTA injury panel hereafter) considered an
appeal of the injury finding. Both panels ruled that the evidences provided by ITA and the
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ITC to justify their findings were not sufficient to conclude the Canadian subsidies and the
injury to the U.S. industry respectively (Zhang 2007). The FTA subsidy panel reported that
the ITA had failed to consider major market factors while examining Canadian stumpage
programs, and that ITA should have conducted a market distortion test. Likewise, the
FTA injury panel concluded that the ITC’s determination of material injury caused by
Canadian lumber imports was not fully supported by substantial evidence. Since both
bi-national panels asked to further examine the findings of both allegations, in September
1993, the ITA of the DOC determined a nearly doubled rate of CVD of 11.54%, and the
ITC also reaffirmed its earlier finding of material injury of the domestic lumber industry
due to Canadian lumber imports (Random Lengths 2014). Both bi-national panels again
rejected the findings of both ITA and ITC pointing out the lack of substantial evidence on
the remand determination.
In order to challenge the decisions of the FTA subsidy panel, the U.S. formally appealed
to an Extraordinary Challenge Committee (ECC) to review the decisions of the panel under
the provision of Article 1904 of Chapter 19 of the FTA (Rahman and Devadoss 2002). The
ECC also rejected the appeal of the U.S. and the Coalition of Fair Lumber Imports in the
CVD case, finding that the decision was binding and non-appealable. Consequently, the
ITA of the DOC terminated the CVD in August 1994, and the US$800 million collected
by the U.S. as CVDs was returned to Canada (Lindsey 2000). Both countries agreed to
establish a consultative mechanism including representatives of the softwood lumber indus-
tries and governments to discuss areas of mutual concerns regarding their forest industries
(Random Lengths 2014).
Even though Canada won the legal cases and both parties agreed to establish a con-
sultative mechanism, the trade issue remained heated in 1995. Representatives of the two
countries met several times to resolve the trade contention. After several rounds of consul-
tation and negotiation, both countries agreed to impose a restricted trade policy governing
imports of Canadian softwood lumber. With a continuous threat of imposing another CVD
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by the U.S. coalition of lumber producers, a final agreement, known as the Softwood Lum-
ber Agreement (SLA) 1996 was reached in April 1996. SLA 1996 described the Canadian
fee-free export limit, quota allocation of the fee-free export amount, fee level, fee collec-
tion and trigger-price mechanism in detail (Zhang 2001). According to SLA 1996, four
Canadian provinces– B.C., Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec–had a annual free lumber export
quota of 14,700 million board feet (mmbf) to export to the U.S. (Random Lengths 2014).
Additional exports of 650 mmbf above the free quota limit were subject to $50 per thou-
sand board feet (mbf) of penalties, and the lumber exports above both limits were subject
to a fee of $100/mbf. The fee levels of $50 and $100 were adjusted annually for infla-
tion in both countries. The Canadian lumber industry collected the quota rents. Further,
the SLA 1996 also specified the trigger price mechanism; if the average quarterly price of
eastern spruce-pine-fir (S-P-F), kiln-dried 2X4s, std&Btr, delivered to the Great Lake area
were above US$405/mbf, 92 million board feet of additional fee-free bonus exports would
be allocated over the following five subsequent quarters (Zhang 2001). Moreover, lumber
exports from Manitoba and Saskatchewan as well as maritime provinces were exempt from
the agreement.
During the SLA 1996 period, there were several trade frictions over the U.S. reclassifi-
cation of pre-drilled S-P-F, rougher-header lumber, and notched studs within the definition
of softwood lumber. However, the World Customs Organization overturned the claims of
U.S. Customs, and ruled that all pre-drilled studs would be classified as joinery and car-
pentry, and excluded from SLA 1996. On the other hand, as B.C. reduced its stumpage
fees by $C3.50-8.10 per cubic meter in May 1998 because of plummeting Asian markets,
the U.S. coalition of the producers (CFLI) charged that B.C. provided a new subsidy to its
producers, and therefore, had breached SLA 1996 (Random Lengths 2014). Both countries
again began formal consultations on the B.C. stumpage issue, but they failed to reach
any meaningful agreement. Despite SLA 1996 and continuous trade debates, 18,030 mmbf
of Canadian softwood lumber was shipped to the U.S. in 1998, and the exports quantity
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mounted to 18,240 mmbf in 1999, well above the par of the free quota limit of 14,700 mmbf
(Random Lengths 2014).
As the expiration of SLA 1996 was approaching, both parties were against the extension
of the agreement beyond March 2001. Canadian and U.S. lumber consumers, specifically
Canada’s Free Trade Lumber Council and the National Lumber and Building Materials
Dealers Association (NLBMDA) in the U.S., were in favor of lobbying for free trade, while
the U.S. CFLI still criticized the so-called Canadian subsidies on timber production, and
vowed to continue their fight. Meanwhile, softwood lumber prices were falling in 2001
mainly because of falling demand in the U.S. caused by declining housing starts, and
oversupply of Canadian lumber due to the structure of SLA 1996 (Zhang 2007). Without
any proposition to resolve the issue further from both sides, SLA 1996 expired on its
scheduled date, March 31, 2001.
2.4 Lumber IV
Lumber IV is all about five years of legal fights and litigation between the U.S. and
Canada. On the very next business day after the expiration of SLA 1996, the U.S. CFLI
filed two petitions to the ITA of the U.S. DOC and U.S. ITC requesting 40% of CVD
and 28-38% of anti-dumping (AD) cases against Canadian lumber imports. In its 5000-
page petition, CFLI alleged that Canadian provincial governments provided subsidies to
domestic producers and that subsidized lumber was dumped in the U.S. The DOC took
quick action, examined the several Canadian market factors and government regulations
including the Canadian stumpage fees, log export restrictions programs, the Western Eco-
nomic Diversification program, the Federal Economic Development Initiative for Northern
Ontario, and the Industry, Trade and Economics program of the Canadian Forest Service
(Rahman and Devadoss 2002). From the lengthy investigation, the U.S. DOC found a pos-
itive affirmation of the alleged subsidy, and levied a 19.31% preliminary CVD against the
Canadian lumber shipments to the U.S. Similarly, as the ITC reported that the U.S. lumber
industry was threatened with material injury by Canadian subsidized lumber imports, the
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DOC imposed a 12.58% of AD on Canadian lumber imports including those from Maritime
provinces. Later in April 2002, the CVD was lowered to 18.79% and a company-specific
rate of 8.42% AD were imposed on Canadian imports (Random Lengths 2014).
While several bilateral talks couldn’t make any progress toward the resolution of the
dispute, Canada filed three petitions to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) challenging the U.S. actions of the CVD and
AD. Since the WTO issued its final confidential reports to each government, both countries
interpreted the decision in their favor. Canada claimed that it had won the case referring
the WTO’s finding of no subsidy. Whereas the U.S. stated that the ruling meant the
existence of Canadian subsidy to domestic producers, but the method used to determine
the level of subsidy was improper (Random Lengths 2014). Likewise, the WTO injury
panel also concluded that the ITC violated WTO rules while claiming the injury threat to
the U.S. industry from Canadian lumber imports.
On Canada’s challenge of the CVD, a NAFTA panel ruled in August 2003 that the
method used by the U.S. DOC to measure the Canadian subsidy was flawed, and asked
it to use a different approach to examine the Canadian stumpage programs (Random
Lengths 2014). The DOC reviewed its method of investigation by using Canadian log
prices to determine subsidy levels instead of using cross-border price comparisons. The
DOC responded to the remand of the NAFTA panel by reducing the level of CVD to 7.8%
in August 2004. The DOC lowered the total duties from 27.2% to 21.2% in December
2004. After back and forth remands and responses to remands between the DOC and the
NAFTA panel five times, the DOC dropped its subsidy calculation to 0.8% in November
2005, which was de minimis.
Likewise, by stating extensive lack of analysis, another NAFTA injury panel also re-
manded the ITC case of injury to the U.S. industry caused by Canadian lumber imports.
ITC revised the analysis and came up with 8.1% of AD as an answer to the remand by the
NAFTA injury panel. The injury panel again, however, rejected most of the ITC’s argu-
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ments, and concluded that ITC’s remand determination of threat injury was not supported
by substantial evidence. After a series of rejections of the ITC’s remand determinations
by the NAFTA injury panel, ITC, in August 2004, finally declared that lumber imports
from Canada didn’t threaten the injury of the U.S. industry. With strong complaint to the
decision of the NAFTA injury panel, the U.S. government appealed to an Extraordinary
Challenge Committee (ECC) in November 2004 accusing the NAFTA panel of having vio-
lated the ethics rules and departing from fundamental rules of procedure (Random Lengths
2014). The ECC panel, however, also ruled in line with the NAFTA injury panel that the
U.S. lumber industry wasn’t threatened with injury by Canadian lumber imports in August
2005. Contrary to the ITC’s allegations, the ECC concluded that the NAFTA panel had
not overused its powers, authority or jurisdiction to reject the U.S. injury claim.
Trade officials from both countries actively engaged in bilateral talks and negotiations
throughout this tumultuous period, and offered several proposals and counter-proposals.
Various interest groups and events, however, prevented the countries from reaching a bilat-
eral agreement. The U.S. CFLI proposed a couple of solutions with tariff-regulated quota
systems to regulate the Canadian share of the U.S. lumber market below 30%, but those
proposals were denied by Canadian producers. The trade battle took a turn when the U.S.
lost both allegations of Canadian subsidy and injury to the U.S. industry in NAFTA pan-
els. After numerous rounds of talks and negotiations between the two counterparts, both
countries reached a tentative seven to nine-year deal in April 2006, the Softwood Lumber
Agreement 2006. According to SLA 2006, the U.S. withdrew all import duties imposed on
Canadian lumber imports, and Canada was obliged to impose variable-rate export charges
ranging from 5-15% and/or quotas on its lumber shipments to the U.S. The free trade
of softwood lumber is allowed if the prevailing monthly price is above $355/mbf. Each
province was free to select option A–tax only or option B–lower tax coupled with a quota.
As a part of the deal, the U.S. agreed not to self-initiate an AD or CVD investigation dur-
ing the SLA period, and to return the collected CVDs and ADs of $4 billion to Canadian
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exporters. $1 billion of the collected duties was kept in the U.S., half of which was provided
to the U.S. CFLI. Both Countries signed the Agreement which was effective from October
2006 on September 12, 2006.
Along with the export charges and quota restraints, the SLA 2006 also specified other
boarder measures including a third country adjustment, and an anti-surge mechanism (SLA
2006; Zhang 2007). The article entitled third country adjustment in SLA 2006 states that
Canada would refund export charges to exporters during any two consecutive quarters if
(a) the non-Canadian imports (the share of third country market) increased by at least
20% in the U.S.; (b) Canadian market share of U.S. consumption declined and; (c) the
share of the U.S. domestic lumber production increased. Moreover, the surge mechanism
stated that if the volume of exports from particular Canadian regions exceeded 111% of
its allocated share in any period, Canada should increase the export charge by 50% on
shipments from that region. Imports from the Maritime provinces and some companies
were excluded from SLA 2006.
2.5 The Softwood Lumber Agreement 2006
Even after the implementation of SLA 2006, trade conflict persisted between the two
countries in terms of interpretations of the surge-trigger mechanism and quota allotments.
The U.S. trade representatives claimed that Canada didn’t specifically follow the SLA and
allowed too much lumber to ship to the U.S. Within a couple of months of SLA 2006 coming
into effect, the U.S. also complained about the action of the Quebec and Ontario provinces
to provide aid packages to their forest industries (Random Lengths 2014). Consequently,
U.S. officials filed two arbitration cases to the London Court of International Arbitration
(LCIA) claiming that Canada did not implement the export surge mechanism properly,
and that Quebec and Ontario subsidized their forest industries which violated SLA’s anti-
circumvention rules. The three-person LCIA panel ruled in a split decision that B.C. and
Alberta did not violate SLA 2006, but Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan had
not properly implemented their quota allotments during the first half of 2007. The LCIA
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panel later concluded that Canada should impose an additional 10% export tax on the
lumber exports from those four eastern provinces until C$68.26 million had been collected.
Instead of an additional 10% export tax, Canada offered a lump sum payment of C$46.7
million. The U.S. rejected the Canadian offer, and implemented a 10% duty on lumber
shipments from those provinces from April 2009 to September 2010 (Random Lengths
2015). Canada finally complied with LCIA’s decision and started imposing additional 10%
export tax on exports from those provinces (U.S. Lumber Coalition 2012).
As per another allegation of Quebec and Ontario’s subsidy program, the LCIA panel
ruled in 2011 that those Canadian provinces violated SLA 2006, hence Quebec and Ontario
had to place additional export charges of 2.6% and 0.1% respectively (Random Lengths
2015). Moreover, in 2011, the U.S. also questioned the timber pricing practices in B.C.
and claimed that B.C. assigned public timber to salvage grade, and sold it to domestic
producers at a very cheap rate. However, later in July 2012, the LCIA panel ruled a
negative determination of the U.S. claims stating that SLA 2006 and the action of B.C.
government were not directly related. In January 2012, despite the several concerns and
challenges about SLA 2006, both countries happily agreed to extend SLA 2006 through
October 2015 without a single amendment to the original agreement. Since January 2013,
except from August to October 2013, free trade of softwood lumber prevailed between the
countries as the prevailing monthly lumber price has been above US$355. SLA 2006 is set




The softwood lumber trade dispute has received considerable attention as an important
research topic since the 1980s. Most of reports expounded the U.S. softwood lumber market
considering lumber imports from Canada, and effects of past trade restriction measures on
the overall market as well as total social welfare in both countries. Several studies used a
reduced-form equation approach to estimate the lumber market empirically, and some of
the studies employed spatial and partial equilibrium models to estimate the welfare effects
of trade restriction measures.
Several early studies examined the underlying factors of U.S. softwood lumber market
using different modeling approaches and econometric estimation techniques. Buongiorno
(1979) developed a monthly softwood lumber imports model for the U.S., and estimated
the model using data from January 1965 to August 1978. They found that importers’
expectations regarding future levels of construction activity, domestic and foreign prices
of softwood lumber and domestic prices of other goods were the primary determinants of
lumber imports in the U.S. Numerous other studies employed historical data on housing
starts, the price of other building materials, and U.S. per capita disposable income to
examine the domestic lumber demand scenario in the U.S. (Uri and Boyd 1991; Myneni et
al. 1994; Baek and Yin 2006; Baek 2011). The most extensive demand and supply models
for the U.S. softwood lumber market were developed and estimated by Song et al. (2011).
Based on the Cobb-Douglas cost function, they derived the demand equation as a function
of factors of production, price of substitute goods, lumber price and housing starts. They
derived the supply equation for the softwood lumber market as a function of prices of input
goods, level of inventory, and lumber price.
A number of studies evaluated the impact of the exchange rate (C$/US$) on the lumber
trade between two countries. McCarl and Haynes (1985) assessed the effects of exchange
rates on softwood lumber trade between the United States and its trading partners partic-
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ularly Canada and Japan. Based on the comparison among the exchange rates, real lumber
prices, and softwood lumber flows in those three countries, they concluded that the pre-
vailing Canadian-U.S. exchange rate led to increase Canadian lumber exports to the U.S,
indicating that the appreciation of U.S. dollars acted as an import subsidy for Canadian
producers. However, based on the econometric estimation and simulation results using
annual data for the 1950-1983 period, Adams et al. (1986) reported that exchange rate
had significant but not prominent effects on the Canadian-U.S. lumber trade. Likewise,
Buongiorno et al. (1988) also examined the effects of exchange rates on Canadian lumber
imports by employing a time-series analysis. Based on the monthly data from January
1974 to January 1986, they found statistically insignificant effects of the exchange rate on
imports. Rather, their results revealed that the increase in the domestic softwood lumber
price in the U.S. led to rise in Canadian imports by 68%. The findings of a vector autore-
gression analysis in Jennings et al. (1991) also supported the results of Buongiorno et al.
(1998). Later, Sarkar (1993) used Johansen’s maximum likelihood cointegration analysis
to investigate the long-run and short-run casual relationship between Canadian lumber
exports to the U.S., the U.S. lumber price, U.S. housing starts and the bilateral exchange
rate. The findings of the maximum likelihood cointegration analysis revealed that the ex-
change rate had a significant long-run positive effect on lumber exports to the U.S., but
the pass-through of exchange rate effects was incomplete indicating the possibility of an
oligopolistic lumber market structure between the U.S. and Canada. However, the effect
of the exchange rate in short-run was found to be insignificant. A recent study by Baek
(2012) also found an insignificant effect of the exchange rate on Canadian lumber exports
to the U.S.
On the other hand, several studies used cointegration testing procedures to examine
the law of one price for the softwood lumber market in the U.S. and Canada. Uri and Boyd
(1990) concluded that there exists a single national market for softwood lumber in the U.S.
as depicted by a strong connection between the demand and prices. Using the multivariate
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Johansen cointegration test, Jung and Doroodian (1994) also substantiated the existence
of a single long-run equilibrium price for four softwood lumber regional markets in the
United Stated during the period 1950-1985. Likewise, with the most disaggregated data
and a large number of price combinations for different products, regions and species, Yin
and Baek (2005) found an existence of the law of one price for the entire United States
softwood lumber market. However, based on a multivariate cointegration test, Nanang
(2000) revealed that the law of one price doesn’t hold for five regional markets of softwood
lumber in Canada. Shahi et al. (2006) tested the law of one price in the ten North American
regional markets for aggregate softwood lumber and homogenous softwood lumber markets,
and showed that the law of one price doesn’t exist in the North American aggregate market.
They also revealed that the law of one price does not hold for any combination of a Canadian
regional market with all five regional markets of the U.S. In striking contrast, Baek (2006)
found that the North American lumber market is integrated, and the U.S. market plays
a dominant role in price setting in the North American lumber market. Baek (2006)
considered different regional markets, softwood lumber types, and data period that Shahi
et al. (2006) selected, which primarily explained the difference in the results between these
two studies.
3.1 The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
Based on simulation and projection approaches, a couple of early studies evaluated
production and welfare impacts of possible U.S trade restriction measures on Canadian
lumber shipments to the U.S. prior to the implementation of the MOU. Using a spatial
equilibrium model, Boyd and Krutilla (1987) projected that net U.S. gain would be positive
with a 10% ad-valorem tariff, but voluntary restraint agreements might boost Canadian
profits by 40%. Similarly, Chen et al. (1988) estimated a four-equation simultaneous
system by two-stage least squares and reported that an imposition of an import tariff or
Canadian export tax on lumber imports resulted in a significant drop in Canadian lumber
imports with little effect on total lumber consumption in the U.S.
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Besides these projections, several studies examined market distortions and welfare ef-
fects of the export tax and a stumpage fee adjustments, the two instruments specified in the
MOU on the softwood lumber markets in both countries. By incorporating annual MOU
dummy variables in the model of Canadian market share, Wear and Lee (1993) estimated
the market and welfare impacts of the MOU. They found significant effects of the MOU
on Canadian market share in the U.S. lumber market, and estimated that U.S. lumber
producers gained almost US$2.6 billion in 1982 dollars with a substantial cost of US$3.8
billion incurred by U.S. consumers. The MOU led to reduce the profits of Canadian pro-
ducers by $136 million, but Canadian provinces were able to collect $301 million in export
tax revenue.
Similarly, by estimating a four-equation system of demand and supply equations for
the U.S. softwood lumber market, Myneni et al. (1994) also evaluated the welfare impacts
of a 15% export tax as specified in the MOU on both countries. Their estimation showed
that the loss incurred by U.S. consumers was 35% larger than the benefits realized by U.S.
producers. Further, Canadian producers incurred the largest loss of almost $400 million
in 1982 dollars followed by U.S. consumers with a mean loss of $150 million. Among the
two policy options specified in the MOU, Bernard et al. (1997) revealed that the export
charges were more effective instruments in redirecting lumber trade than were increases
in stumpage prices by Canadian provinces. Likwise, Baek and Yin (2006) also reported
that the MOU was able to reduce the Canadian lumber exports by 8.4-9%, and increase
the U.S. lumber production by 3%. However, Zhang (2001; 2006) estimated a statistically
insignificant impact of the MOU on the overall lumber price in the U.S. Similarly, using
advanced time-series econometrics on the longer monthly dataset, recent studies by Song
et al. (2011) and Nagubadi and Zhang (2013) estimated that the MOU had a statistically
insignificant effect on Canadian lumber exports to the U.S. The latter two studies explained
that due to the larger sample period and several policy and market events, their models
might have overlooked the smaller market variations caused by the MOU.
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3.2 The Softwood Lumber Agreement 1996
A number of studies investigated the effects of the Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA)
1996 on the lumber markets and total social welfare in both countries. Using the regression
estimates of an overall softwood lumber market in the U.S., Lindsey et al. (2000) estimated
that due to the imposition of SLA 1996, U.S. consumers had to bear an additional $50 to $80
per mbf to the real price of lumber, which increased home costs by $800 to $1300. Likewise,
estimating an aggregate lumber price model, Zhang (2001) estimated an anticipated change
in the lumber price of $59 per mbf in 1997 U.S. dollars due to the imposition of SLA 1996.
Zhang (2001) reported that the loss incurred by U.S. consumers clearly overshadowed the
gain realized by U.S. producers, and SLA 1996 resulted in a dead weight loss of around
$1 billion. In the meantime, Canada realized more than $3 billion in benefits. Zhang
(2006) re-estimated Zhang(2001)’s aggregate price model with a longer data set covering
the complete period of SLA 1996, and revealed that the price effect of SLA 1996 was $30
per mbf instead. Compared with estimates of Zhang (2001), the estimated figures in each
category were relatively smaller in Zhang (2006).
Several recent studies with a large data sample, however, found a statistically insignif-
icant effect of SLA 1996 on the softwood lumber trade between the two countries. Using
advanced time-series econometric estimation approaches, Baek and Yin (2006), Song et al.
(2011) and Nagubadi and Zhang (2013) revealed that SLA 1996 had no significant effects
on Canadian lumber exports to the U.S. Baek and Yin (2006) pointed to the structure
of SLA 1996, which consisted of a duty-free quota, a trigger price mechanism, and other
excluded categories, had no effect on the lumber trade between the two countries.
3.3 The Lumber IV period
Right after the termination of SLA 1996, employing the quota rent concept, van Kooten
(2002) developed a theoretical model of the Canada-U.S. softwood lumber trade to explore
the effects of possible trade restrictions including import quota, import tariff and export
tax on the distribution of economic rents in the U.S. and Canada. Using numerical il-
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lustrations, he concluded that Canada should prefer export quotas to both free trade or
an export/import tax. If the U.S. lumber imports from other regions could be restricted,
Canadian lumber producers were able to increase their overall wellbeing by voluntarily
restricting lumber exports to the U.S. He also revealed that forming a cartel of Canadian
lumber producers to sell lumber to the U.S. would benefit both Canadian and U.S. lumber
producers. Considering the fact that U.S. and Canadian lumber products have different
quality, Mogus et al. (2006) used a spatial price equilibrium model to examine the effects
of import duties on Canadian lumber. They found that after controlling for substitution
bias, Canadian producers would suffer less from the trade restrictions.
Similarly, several studies projected the market scenarios of the U.S.-Canada softwood
lumber trade in the post-SLA 1996 period. Adams (2003) projected a 7% average annual
reduction in imports from Canada over the period from 2002 to 2010 due to the imposition
of 27.2% import tariffs on lumber imports from Canada. He predicted that Canadian old-
growth timber harvest would decline with an increase in the timber harvest on private lands
in the U.S. Likewise, by developing multi-regional spatial equilibrium models, Devadoss et
al. (2005) and Devadoss (2006) concluded that the U.S. retaliatory tariff of 27.2% on
Canadian lumber imports affected lumber markets all around the world. U.S. producers
realized the largest benefits with a 8.16% rise in domestic production, and consumers in
the U.S. South incurred the greatest loss due to the restrictions on the Canadian lumber
imports. Canadian producers could compensate their loss from the U.S. trade restriction
policies by redirecting their exports to Japan and European countries.
Based on historical actual time-series data, a couple of studies evaluated the effects of
CVDs and ADs imposed by the U.S. during the period of 2001-early 2006. Employing a
2SLS approach of estimating dynamic supply and demand equations, Song et al. (2011)
revealed that the impact of such tariffs between August 2001 and October 2006 was fairly
limited because of the low price elasticity of Canadian softwood lumber. Unlike previous
studies which used indicator dummy variables to capture the effects of trade restrictions,
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Song et al. (2011) calculated the actual rate of monthly CVDs and ADs placed by the
U.S., and incorporated it into their empirical analysis. Using the multivariate vector error
correction model, however, Nagubadi and Zhang (2013) estimated a 13% reduction in
softwood lumber imports from Canada due to the imposition of CVDs and ADs by the
U.S. Unlike Song et al. (2011), they used an indicator dummy variable to specify import
duties in their empirical model.
As an important contribution to the literature, Zhang (2007) published a comprehensive
book on the lumber trade dispute between the U.S. and Canada, examining the dispute
from analytical, political, and economic perspectives. The softwood lumber dispute and
legal proceedings were so intense that Zhang (2007) ironically regarded the trade dispute
as “the softwood lumber war” between two otherwise friendly nations. He scrutinized
each and every historical and political event that kept this trade issue in hot contention
throughout the last three decades. The first eight chapters of the book explained each of the
trade dispute in the modern era from Lumber I to Lumber IV. Zhang (2007) also presented
a detailed comparative political economy of the softwood lumber war and the Newsprint
tariff battle between the two countries. The book, as a final chapter, also expounded on
the lessons learned from the past, the underlying causes of the lumber dispute, and possible
solutions and potential routes. Zhang (2007) stated that an increase in American ownership
of Canadian lumber mills (and vice versa), and a significant drop in Canada’s comparative
advantage in softwood resource endowments could lead to a long-term and durable solution,
which would ultimately guide the trade war towards a natural ending.
3.4 The Softwood Lumber Agreement 2006
Only a few studies have evaluated the impacts of SLA 2006 on softwood lumber trade
between two countries. Baek (2011) calculated the welfare effects of SLA 2006 by estimating
an econometric model of U.S. lumber imports from Canada. He found that SLA 2006 has a
significant negative effect on lumber imports during the period of July 2007-October 2009.
His econometric approach of estimating the model, however, is relatively weak. Using
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the fully modified ordinary least square (FM-OLS) approach of estimating a time-series
model, Baek (2012) also estimated a significant negative long-term effect of SLA 2006
on U.S. lumber imports from Canada from January 2007 to June 2009. A recent study
by Nagubadi and Zhang (2013) also reported that, during the period of October 2006 -
March 2013, SLA 2006 had reduced U.S. imports of softwood lumber by 11.2%. Since both
Baek(2012) and Nagubadi and Zhang (2013) employed an indicator dummy to capture the
effect of SLA 2006, the dummy variable could reflect the joint effects of both SLA 2006
and the housing market bust. One could argue that the reduction in U.S. lumber demand
during the SLA 2006 period was primarily the result of the U.S. housing market bust.
Moreover, using the simulation approach of the world lumber market, van Kooten and
Johnston (2014) projected that with the removal of the export tax on Canadian lumber
exports to the U.S., Canadian lumber production would rise by 3.2 million m3. But the
change in welfare would be moderate: the net loss to U.S. lumber producers would be $112
million, but the U.S. consumers could gain $107 million.
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Chapter 4
The United States-Canada Softwood Lumber
Agreement 2006: A Cournot-Nash Duopoly Model
4.1 Introduction: Strategic Trade Policy Models
The strategic aspects of trade policy were first introduced by Brander (1981) as an
important tool to investigate trade policy debates. Strategic trade policy is an application
of oligopoly theory, which affects the outcome of strategic interactions between firms in
actual or potential international trade markets (Spencer and Brander 2008). It considers
an application of non-cooperative game theory and uses the Nash equilibrium concept on
the sequential structure of decision-making (Brander 1997). Brander (1981) first applied
the concept of the strategic trade policy to explain intra-industry trade in identical goods.
Later, a number of papers applied strategic trade policy to assess the strategic interactions
between a domestic and a foreign firm under international duopoly and monopolistic com-
petition. Brander and Spencer (1981) developed a model of entry deterrence to analyze the
effectiveness of tariffs to extract monopoly rents from imperfectly competitive foreign firms.
Spencer and Brander (1983) developed a three-stage subgame perfect model to study the
behavior of governments and firms, and revealed that industrial strategies such as R&D or
export subsidies can increase domestic welfare by shifting profits from foreign to domestic
firms. Brander and Spencer (1984a, 1984b) determined the specific optimum tariff rate for
extracting rent from imperfectly competitive foreign firms. Another notable application
of strategic trade policy is Brander and Spencer (1985), which considered a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium model to depict the profit-shifting role of export subsidies to a domestic firm.
Under the framework of strategic trade policy, several studies examined the trade in-
tervention and welfare effects of trade policies under olilogpoly (Dixit 1984; Krugman 1984;
Eaton and Grossman 1986), and revealed that trade restriction policies can raise national
welfare in imperfectly competitive markets. Eaton and Grossman (1986) analyzed the ef-
fects of industrial policies including production taxes and subsidies, and found that such
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domestic policies are also effective in shifting oligopolistic profits from foreign firms. Dixit
(1988) examined the optimum domestic policies in response to foreign export subsidies
under oligopoly, and concluded that countervailing tariffs could be an effective domestic
measure to offset part of a foreign export subsidy. By developing a basic homogenous
Cournot oligopoly model between two countries, Colie (1991) also analyzed various domes-
tic retaliation measures which affect the profit-shifting argument for foreign export subsi-
dies. Following Brander and Spencer (1984, 1985) and Colie (1991), this study develops a
two-country homogenous Cournot-Nash duopoly model of softwood lumber production in
the U.S. and Canada.
4.2 The Cournot-Nash Duopoly Model
This study considers a basic model of two-country homogenous Cournot-Nash duopoly
as a strategic trade policy model to investigate the strategic interactions of lumber trade
between the U.S. and Canada. We assume that the U.S. is the home country and Canada
the foreign country. Let x be the quantity of softwood lumber produced by the U.S.
firm, and the Canadian firm produces and sells y units of softwood lumber in the U.S.
market. The Canadian consumption of softwood lumber is ignored, since two thirds of
Canadian lumber production is shipped to international markets. Total sales in the U.S.
lumber market are Q = x + y. Let the linear inverse demand function be given by P =
P (Q) = p(x + y). The U.S. firm has a constant production cost of cus per mbf, and the
Canadian firm has a constant cost of cca per mbf. The difference in marginal costs of
production accounts for the national differences in production efficiency of sawmills as well
as resource endowments. Transportation costs are ignored for simplicity. We assume that
both Canadian and U.S. firms produce identical softwood lumber of homogenous quality.
Consequently, consumers in the U.S. are indifferent to the lumber source, and a single
representative price (P) represents the entire softwood lumber market.
According to SLA 2006, the magnitude of the export tax is a function of the prevailing
monthly price of softwood lumber. Since Alberta and British Columbia, the two major
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lumber exporting Canadian provinces accounting for almost 66% of Canadian exports to
the U.S. follow option A of the agreement, this study only considers option A and ignores
option B. Let t be the export tax which decreases with increasing market price of softwood
lumber.
A non-cooperative equilibrium exists when each country is maximizing its profit with
respect to its own strategy variable i.e. quantity of softwood lumber, given the level of the
quantity of lumber produced by another country. The strategy space of both firms is [0,∞),
which indicates that both countries can alter their level of softwood production freely,
given the level of their rival country. Given that P (Q) is decreasing, twice continuously
differentiable, and QP (Q) is bounded, there exists a unique Cournot equilibrium (Colie,
1991). The profit functions for the U.S. and Canadian firms (π and π∗) are specified as:
π = Px− cusx (4.1)
π∗ = Py − ccay − tPy (4.2)
where, asterisk denotes the profit function associated with the Canadian firm
Assuming that an interior solution where both firms produce positive quantity of soft-
wood lumber exists, the first-order conditions (FOCs) for the U.S. and Canadian firms
are:
πx = P + xP
′ − cus = 0 (4.3)
π∗y = (1− t)P + y(1− t)P ′ − cca = 0 (4.4)
Likewise, second-order condition of both profit functions are:
πxx = 2P
′ + xP ′′ < 0 (4.5)
π∗yy = 2(1− t)P ′ + y(1− t)P ′′ < 0 (4.6)
where, primes and subscripts denote the derivatives; and P ′ < 0. These FOCs define
the reaction functions of U.S. and Canadian lumber-producing firms. Each firm shows its
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best response to the output chosen by another firm in the implicit form. The simultane-
ous solution of equations (4.3) and (4.4) for the optimum quantity of softwood lumber
production is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
We also use the following conditions:
πxy ≡ P ′ + xP ′′ < 0; π∗yx ≡ (1− t)P ′ + y(1− t)P ′′ < 0 (4.7)
Condition (4.7) implies that the marginal revenue of each firm declines with increases in
the quantity of the other firm, which is equivalent to reaction functions being downward
sloping (Brander and Krugman 1983; Brander and Spencer 1985). It implies that both
U.S. and Canadian softwood lumber are strategic substitutes to each other.
From condition (4.5) - (4.7), we have:







yy − π∗yxπxy > 0 (4.9)
Comparative Static Analyses
In order to obtain the comparative static results for the effects of the agreement on
production of softwood lumber by both firms, we employ the total differentiation of the











Using (4.3) and (4.4), we have πxt = 0 and π
∗
yt = −(P + P ′y). As P is always positive and
P ′ is always negative, the sign of the π∗yt is ambiguous. However, we show that the sign of
π∗yt is negative
1. With this note, we derive the dx/dt and dy/dt using Cramer’s rule2.
xt ≡ dx/dt = πxyπ∗yt/D > 0 (4.11)
1We prove it by contradiction. Suppose, a linear inverse demand function P = a + P ′y as in Brander
and Spencer (1985), and let P ′y > P . Then, P ′y > a + P ′y, which suggests that 0 > a. But, in linear
demand, there must be a > 0. So we can conclude that P > P ′y, and π∗yt < 0.
2See Appendix A for detailed derivation.
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yt ≡ dy/dt = −πxxπ∗yt/D < 0 (4.12)
Using (4.5), (4.7) and (4.9), we derive an important proposition from (4.11) and (4.12) that
an increase in the Canadian export tax increases U.S. production and decreases Canadian
softwood lumber production.
Effects of export tax on overall lumber price, and profits of U.S. and Canadian
firms
We assess the effects of export tax on overall price of softwood lumber, and the profits
of both U.S. and Canadian firms 3.
1. Effects on the lumber price




yt)− (πxxπ∗yt)]/D, using (11) and (12)
= > 0, using (8) and (9) (4.13)
Condition (4.13) depicts that the overall price of softwood lumber increases with an
increase in export tax.
2. Effects on the profit of a U.S. firm
To analyze the effect of export tax on the profit of a U.S. firm, we totally differentiate
the condition (4.1) with respect to t. Then, we have:
πt ≡ dπ/dt = πxxt + πyyt
Using πx = 0 from (3), πy = xP
′ and yt = −πxxπ∗yt/D < 0 from (4.12);
πt = −xP ′πxxπ∗yt/D > 0 (4.14)
We can see that an increase in the export tax imposed by Canada on softwood lumber
exports increases profits of a U.S. firm.
3. Effects on the profit of a Canadian firm
3We closely follow Brander and Spencer (1985) to derive the proofs.
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Using the same procedure, the effect of export tax on the profit of Canadian firm:
π∗t ≡ dπ∗/dt = π∗xxt + π∗yyt + δπ∗/δt
Using π∗y = 0 from (4.4), π
∗
x = (1 − t)yP ′, xt = πxyπ∗yt/D > 0 from (4.11), and
δπ∗/δt = −Py;
π∗t = (1− t)yP ′πxyπ∗yt/D − Py < 0 (4.15)
We found that an export tax decreases the overall profit of Canadian firms.
Conditions (4.13) - (4.15) depict that an obligatory imposition of export tax on soft-
wood lumber exports increases overall lumber price and the profit of U.S. lumber-producing
firms, but reduces the profit of Canadian firms. These results are consistent with the trade
theory that an export tax in a single-market hurt the producers in the exporting country,
whereas it favors the producers in the importing country (Appleyard et al., 2011).
4.3 Linear demand-An illustration
let’s assume the special case that the demand function is linear as:
P = P (Q) = a− b(x+ y) (4.16)
where a and b are demand parameters and always positive, and p(Q) = 0 for Q ≥ a.
Now, profit functions of U.S. and Canadian firms are simplified as:
π = (a− bx− by)x− cusx (4.17)
π∗ = (1− t)(a− bx− by)y − ccay (4.18)








= (1− t)(a− bx− 2by)− cca = 0 (4.20)
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= −2b(1− t) (4.22)
Solving two FOCs, the Cournot equilibrium quantities (xc, yc) for the U.S. and Cana-





















































[(a+ cus)(1− t)− 2cca]2
9b(1− t)
(4.28)
It can be inferred from equations (4.25)- (4.28), the equilibrium quantity of softwood lumber
production, overall lumber price, and profits of both firms are primarily determined by the
values of the linear demand parameters a and b, the lumber production costs in the U.S.
and Canada, and the level of the export tax as specified in SLA 2006.
In order to examine the effects of the export tax t on softwood lumber production,
lumber price and profits of firms, the first derivatives of conditions (4.23) – (4.28) are
evaluated. Consistent with the results concluded in equations (4.13)- (4.15), the special
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From equation (4.24), we know that (a+cus
3b
) > ( 2cca




(4.34) is unambiguously negative.
Based on the equations (4.29)- (4.34), it can be concluded that the obligatory export tax
on Canadian lumber exports as specified in SLA 2006 increases U.S. lumber production
and decreases the quantity of Canadian lumber exports to the U.S. Likewise, it is able
to increase the overall lumber price and the profits of U.S. lumber-producing firms, and
reduces the profits of Canadian firms.
One useful condition that allows us to interpret the relationship between U.S. and
Canadian softwood lumber is given by (identical to equation (4.7)):
δ2πus
δxδy
≡ −b < 0; δ
2πca
δxδy
≡ −b(1− t) < 0 (4.35)
Condition (4.35) implies that the marginal revenue of each firm declines with an increase
in the quantity of the other firm, which is equivalent to reaction functions being downward




How Effective is the United States-Canada Softwood
Lumber Agreement 2006? An Econometric Study
5.1 Introduction
The ongoing softwood lumber trade dispute between the U.S. and Canada is one of the
longest and most contentious trade battles in international trade history. The softwood
lumber trade between these two countries is an important inter-country political issue,
because it involves billions of dollars of trade each year. The underlying causes behind
this dispute include the public ownership of forest land in Canada, timber subsidies by
provincial governments to Canadian lumber producers (Lindsey et al. 2000), and U.S.
retaliatory measures of countervailing duties (CVDs) and anti-dumping (ADs) tariffs (De-
vadoss 2006). Unlike in the U.S. where 58% of the forests are owned by the private sector,
almost 94% of Canadian timber lands are under the ownership of federal and provincial
governments (Abboushi 2010). U.S. lumber producers have been arguing that provincial
governments in Canada provide subsidies to lumber industries in the form of low stumpage
prices for harvesting the standing timber, and that subsidized Canadian lumber exports
are dumped in the U.S. In fact, exercising their prerogative to value the public forests,
Canadian provincial governments determine the stumpage price administratively rather
than through a competitive auction bid (Zhang 2007).
The Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA) 2006 is a nine-year trade agreement between
the U.S. and Canada, and has been in effect since late 2006 to limit Canadian lumber
shipments to the U.S. It is a price-driven ad-valorem export tax rate coupled with a quota
system. According to the agreement, provinces in Canada must choose between Option
A and Option B on the softwood lumber exports to the U.S. Option A is solely an ex-
port charge ranging from 0-15% of the prevailing monthly price; whereas option B is an
export charge of 0-5% combined with a volume restraint (SLA 2006). Alberta and British
Columbia, the two major Canadian lumber-producing provinces, follow option A, while
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other Canadian lumber producing provinces such as Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Ontario and
Quebec follow option B of the agreement. As specified in SLA 2006, the rate of the Cana-
dian export tax and/or volume restraint is a function of the prevailing monthly price: the
higher the lumber price, the fewer (or no) export barriers to the U.S. Free trade of softwood
lumber prevails if the prevailing monthly price is above $US 355 per thousand board feet
(mbf), but Canada has to impose a constant 15% export tax if the monthly lumber price
is under $US 315/mbf.
This paper evaluates the impact of SLA 2006 on the softwood lumber trade between
the U.S. and Canada. By estimating econometric models for the U.S. softwood lumber
market using monthly time-series data, this study specifically examines the effects of the
export tax imposed by Canada on the U.S. domestic lumber supply as well as on Canadian
exports to the U.S. Unlike the previous studies, this study primarily focuses on the SLA
2006 period, and computes the actual dollar value of the export tax collected by Canada
during this period. Moreover, Canadian monthly lumber exports from Maritime provinces
and SLA-excluded companies are deducted from the total Canadian lumber shipments to
the U.S. More importantly, the data period of this study covers a wide spectrum of lumber
prices from a low of $195/mbf to a high of $437/mbf. Consequently, the wide variation
in the softwood lumber market presents an opportunity to provide a much more accurate
calibration of the market, something that was not previously possible.
In stark contrast to the results from previous studies, results reveal that SLA 2006 has
limited influence on the softwood lumber trade between the U.S. and Canada. Apparently,
SLA 2006 is ignored by the lumber market and the lumber trade between the U.S. and
Canada is instead determined by market forces. In other words, while much of this trade
dispute is thought to be governed by strategic behavior leading to protracted negotiations,
market forces seems simply to ignore all these so-called strategic considerations and operate
freely in this arena. While SLA 2006 is going to expire in 2015, the findings of this study
provide useful insights into this trade dispute between the U.S. and Canada.
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5.2 A Brief History of the Trade Dispute
Table 5.1 presents the major trade barriers imposed by the U.S. on Canadian softwood
lumber imports since the late 1980s.1 The primary objective of those trade policies was to
limit Canada’s market share in the U.S. softwood lumber market, which would ultimately
raise the domestic lumber price in the U.S. During the period between mid 1970s and mid
1980s, Canadian softwood lumber imports rose sharply by around 136% and captured more
than one-third of the U.S. lumber market (Buongiorno et al. 1988). U.S. lumber producers,
who argued that the Canadian government subsidized the stumpage prices for Canadian
lumber industries, started lobbying for retaliatory measures against Canadian softwood
lumber imports (Zhang 2007). Since the U.S. International Trade Commission estimated
a 15% subsidy on Canadian softwood stumpage price in 1986, both countries endorsed
a five-year memorandum of understanding (MOU) under which provincial governments in
Canada either had to levy a 15% export tax on its lumber shipments to the U.S. or increase
the prevailing stumpage prices.
When the Canadian government unilaterally terminated the MOU in 1991, the U.S.
government immediately imposed interim duties on Canadian lumber imports. After sev-
eral rounds of debates and negotiations, both countries formulated the Softwood Lumber
Agreement in 1996, and that was effective for next five years. It was a tariff-regulated quota
system restricting Canadian lumber imports to the U.S. for five years (Zhang 2001). SLA
1996 specified annual duty-free export quotas of 14.7 billion board feet (bbf) of softwood
lumber. For export quantities of over 14.7 bbf, SLA 1996 specified US$50-$100 per mbf
of the export fee on Canadian lumber shipments to the U.S. Since both U.S. and Cana-
dian governments were reluctant to renew the agreement upon its expiration in 2001, the
U.S. government again started imposing province-specific duty rates on Canadian lumber
imports.
1Please refer to Random Lengths (2014) and Zhang (2007) for a more detailed history of the softwood
lumber dispute.
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Table 5.1: U.S. trade restriction measures on Canadian softwood lumber imports
Duration Trade policies Description
1987-1991 MOU 15% export tax or stumapge price adjustment
1991-1992 CVD and AD Province-specific countervailing duties
and antidumping tariffs: 3.1 to 15%
1992 Interim CVD 14.48%
1992-1994 CVD (Ad Valorem) 6.51%
1996-2001 SLA 1996 Tariff-rate quota
2001-2006 Various CVD and AD AD: 2.11%–3.78%; and CVD: 8.7%–31.89%
2006-2015 SLA 2006 0–15% tax of export price or
export charge of 0–5% with volume restraint
Source: Zhang(2007) and Random Lengths (2015)
The period between 2001 and late 2006 was one of turmoil during which the U.S.
Department of Commerce implemented several CVDs and ADs up to a rate of 27.2%.
Canada challenged all U.S. actions at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and won most of the cases. After numerous
rounds of talks and negotiations between the two governments, they finally reached a
tentative seven-year agreement in 2006. Following the bilateral agreement, which was
implemented in October 2006, the U.S. withdrew all import duties imposed on Canadian
lumber imports, and the Canadian government started imposing a 5 to 15% export tax
and/or quotas on Canadian shipments to the U.S. As a part of the negotiation, the U.S.
returned abou5 $5 billion to Canada as compensation for the earlier CVDs and ADs. In
2012, trade representatives from both countries signed a two-year extension of the softwood
lumber agreement through 2015 without changing the structure of the 2006 agreement
(Random Lengths, 2014).
5.3 Literature Review
The softwood lumber trade dispute has received considerable attention among trade
economists since the late 1980s. Employing various economic tools and techniques, several
studies have analyzed the effects of past trade restriction measures on the overall social
welfare of both countries. Spatial price equilibrium analysis was the common approach
applied to evaluate the welfare effects of the trade policies. Early studies by Boyd and
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Krutilla (1987), Chen et al. (1988), Wear and Lee (1993), and Myneni et al. (1994)
specifically studied the welfare effects of the 1986 MOU. They revealed that this MOU was
successful in limiting Canadian lumber exports to the U.S. However, using advanced time-
series econometrics on a longer monthly dataset, recent studies by Song et al. (2011) and
Nagubadi and Zhang (2013) estimated that the MOU had a statistically non-significant
effect on Canadian lumber exports to the U.S.
Likewise, a number of past studies evaluated the effects of SLA 1996 on the U.S. and
Canadian softwood lumber markets. Based on the econometric estimation, the rise in the
real lumber price due to the imposition of SLA 1996 was estimated to be between US$30
and US$80 mbf (Lindsey et al. 2000; Zhang 2001; Zhang 2006). Kinnucan and Zhang
(2004) also estimated that 63% of the Canadian export tax was transferred to Canadian
consumers during the SLA 1996 period. After the expiration of SLA 1996, van Kooten
(2002) explored the effects of various trade restrictions including import quota, tariff and
export tax on the distribution of economic rents in the U.S. and Canada, and suggested
that forming a cartel of Canadian lumber producers to sell lumber in the U.S. would benefit
both Canadian and U.S. lumber producers.
Similarly, several studies evaluated the effects of the U.S. CVDs and ADs on Canadian
imports in the post-SLA 1996 period. Some of the notable studies that analyzed the effects
of import duties on lumber imports are Adams (2003), Devadoss et al. (2005), Devadoss
(2006), Mogus et al. (2006). By developing multi-regional spatial equilibrium models, De-
vadoss et al. (2005) and Devadoss (2006) estimated that U.S. producers realized the largest
benefits, and consumers in the U.S. South incurred the greatest losses due to the restric-
tions on Canadian lumber imports. On the other hand, Yin and Baek (2004) and Baek and
Yin (2006) focused on methodological improvements over the past studies, and estimated
a non-structural vector auto-regression model of the U.S. softwood lumber market. Baek
and Yin (2006) found that MOU was an effective trade agreement to restrict the Canadian
lumber shipments to the U.S., but SLA 1996 was unable to work as expected. Based on
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time-series econometric estimation, Song et al. (2011) and Nagubadi and Zhang (2013),
however, reported that SLA 1996 had a statistically non-significant effect on Canadian
lumber exports to the U.S.
Only a few studies have evaluated the impact of SLA 2006 on softwood lumber trade
between the two countries. Based on an analysis of the world lumber market, van Kooten
(2013) projected that by removing the export tax on Canadian lumber exports to the
U.S., U.S. lumber production would decrease by nearly 1 million m3 and Canadian lumber
production would rise by 3.2 million m3. Likewise, Baek (2011; 2012) estimated a significant
negative effect of SLA 2006 on U.S. lumber imports from Canada. A recent study by
Nagubadi and Zhang (2013) also reported that SLA 2006 reduced U.S. imports of softwood
lumber by 11.2%. Both of these studies included the Canadian export tax into their
empirical models as a dummy variable for the period of SLA 2006. Specifying the dummy
(indicator) variable for the SLA 2006 period could also measure the combined effects of
other unknown variables. For instance, Majumdar et al. (2010) concluded that the dummy
variable of SLA 2006 in the period of 2007-2009 also captured the effects of the great
financial crisis on the U.S. softwood lumber production. Therefore, the previous findings
on the effects of SLA 2006 based on the dummy variable might be less reliable. In lieu of the
dummy variable, we compute the actual amount of monthly export tax ($/mbf) collected
by Canada, and incorporate it in the empirical modeling as a continuous variable. We use
the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) approach to estimate demand and
supply equations for the U.S. softwood lumber market. Since we specifically include the
export tax as a continuous variable, we cannot utilize the data series prior to the SLA 2006
period.
5.4 Theoretical Framework
In order to estimate an econometric model for the U.S. softwood lumber market, we
follow the theoretical framework devised by past studies, specifically, Myneni et al. (1994),
Baek and Yin (2006) and Song et al. (2011). We modified model specifications of Song et
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al. (2011) and included our variables of interest in order to evaluate the effects of SLA 2006.
Generally, a Cobb-Douglas profit function for the softwood lumber industry is considered
to derive the lumber supply model, and a Cobb-Douglas cost function is taken into account
to derive the lumber demand equation (Song et al. 2011). The following dynamic system
of demand and supply equations for the U.S. softwood lumber market is considered.
qst =α0 + α1pt + α2etart + α3coext + α4ptimt−1 + α5vt−1 + α6wst + α7rt+
α8octt + α9novt + α10dect + α11jant + α12febt + α13qst−1 + α14qst−2
+ · · ·+ α24qst−12 + εst
(5.1)
qct =β0 + β1pt + β2etart + β3coext + β4ptimct−1 + β5vct−1 + β6wct + β7rct+
β8xct + β9octt + β10novt + β11dect + β12jant + β13febt + β14qct−1
+ β15qct−2 + · · ·+ β25qct−12 + εct
(5.2)
qdt =γ0 + γ1pt + γ2ht + γ3pbt + γ4rect + γ5octt + γ6novt + γ7dect + γ8jant
+ γ9febt + γ10qdt−1 + γ11qdt−2 + · · ·+ γ21qdt−12 + εdt
(5.3)
Table 5.2 presents a detailed description of each variable in equations (5.1) - (5.3)
and their respective data sources. The terms qst and qdt denote monthly supply and
demand quantities of softwood lumber in the U.S, and qct refers to Canadian monthly
softwood lumber exports from the provinces which are included in SLA 2006. The term
pt represents the Random Lengths monthly composite lumber price, which is a weighted
average of 15 key framing lumber prices in the U.S. and Canada (SLA 2006); ptimt−1
and ptimct−1 refer to the prices of the timber material in the U.S. and Canada in the
previous month respectively; vt−1 and vct−1 represent the softwood lumber inventory in
the U.S. and Canada in previous month respectively. We included octt, novt, dect, jant
and febt as monthly dummy variables for October, November, December, January and
Februry respectively to capture the seasonal effects in all three equations. In order to
address the autocorrelation issue in each equation, up to 12 lags of each dependent variable
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are included in each equation. Moreover, εst, εct and εdt denote i.i.d. error terms in U.S.
supply, Canadian export supply to the U.S., and U.S. demand equations of the softwood
lumber market respectively.
Table 5.2: Variables, their descriptions and sources (2006:10 - 2014:07)
Variable Description Source
qst U.S. lumber supply: shipments from U.S. West Random Lengths
a
(Inland and Coast) + production from U.S. South
qdt U.S. lumber demand: total supply + imports Random Lengths
– exports
qct Canadian lumber exports to the U.S. Foreign Affairs, Trade
from SLA 2006 included provinces Development Canada
pt Lumber composite price
b Random Lengths
etart Export tax according to SLA 2006
c Random Lengths
coext Canadian overseas lumber exports Random Lengths
vt U.S. lumber inventory-U.S. west as a proxy Random Lengths
vct Canadian lumber inventory Random Lengths
ptimt U.S. timber price-a price index of softwood U.S. BLS
d
logs, bolts and timber
ptimct Canadian timber price-a price index of Statistics Canada
softwood logs and bolts
wst Wage rate of U.S. sawmill workers U.S. BLS
wct Wage rate of Canadian sawmill workers Statistics Canada
rt U.S. three-year treasury constant U.S. Federal Reserve
maturity rates System
rct Canadian three-year benchmark bond yields Statistics Canada
ht Housing starts in the U.S.- seasonally adjusted U.S. Census Bureau
annual rate
pbt Price index of common building bricks U.S. BLS
xct Canada/U.S. foreign exchange rate U.S. Federal Reserve
System
rect Global financial crisis 2008-2009 1 for 2007:12–2009:06
aVarious monthly issues of Random Lengths Yardstick (2006-2014)
bRandom Lengths lumber composite price
cExport tax rate multiplied by pt−2
dU.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
Two variables etart and coext are the major variables of interest, representing the
export tax per mbf of softwood lumber and the quantity of the Canadian overseas lumber
exports respectively. The export tax rate is option A export charge that Canada imposes on
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its shipments to the U.S. According to option A of SLA 20062, the export tax is primarily
based on the prevailing monthly lumber price pt. The definition of prevailing monthly
lumber price is somewhat complex. The prevailing monthly price, as defined in SLA 2006,
is the four-week average of the Random Lengths framing lumber composite prices available
21 days before the beginning of the month to which the prevailing monthly price will be
applied. In other words, the level of export tax for the current month (t) is based on the
level of average monthly Random Lengths composite price from approximately two months
prior (t−2). The Random Lengths framing lumber composite price is a broad index of the
overall softwood lumber market in the U.S, which is a weighted average of fifteen structural
lumber prices in the U.S and Canada (Random Lengths 2014). Therefore, the export tax
rate is multiplied by the lumber composite price of two months prior (pt−2) to obtain the
export tax per mbf in the current month.
As the share of Canadian overseas exports (China, Japan and European countries) has
been increasing substantially, particularly in last six years, this study attempts to evaluate
the effects of the coext on the lumber supply in the U.S. and Canada. The variable coext not
only captures the dynamics of the overseas softwood lumber market but also incorporates
the impact of expanded Asian lumber markets. On the other hand, we include a dummy
variable (recs) in the demand equation to capture the effects of the 2008-09 global financial
crisis on the softwood lumber market. The recession was primarily triggered by the sub-
prime mortgage crisis and the U.S. housing market bust. It persisted for 19 months from
December 2007 to June 2009 (NBER 2010).
5.5 Model Estimation
Since demand and supply quantities (qst, qct and qdt) and the lumber price (pt) are
endogenous, the issue of simultaneous equation bias emerges while empirically estimating
the system of equations (5.1) – (5.3). The system of simultaneous equations satisfies
the order conditions for identification, as each equation includes more excluded exogenous
2For simplicity, we model only option A in this study. Option B while being adopted by four Canadian
provinces, represents on average only 19% of the monthly exports to the U.S.
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variables than endogenous variables. Given that the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator
is inconsistent in the presence of simultaneous equation bias, limited information estimators
and full information estimators are commonly used to consistently estimate the coefficients
of the system of equations (Greene 2011, p. 326). The limited information estimators such
as two-stage least squares (2SLS) and limited information maximum likelihood (LIML)
are single-equation estimation approaches, whereas the full information estimators such as
three-stage least squares (3SLS) and full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimate
all equations jointly. Even though full information estimators are asymptotically more
efficient, any specification error in the structure of the model is transmitted throughout the
system, and they usually have larger finite-sample variance (Greene 2011, p. 333). While
the 2SLS method is widely applied to estimate a system of equations, the LIML approach
performs better in the presence of weak and/or a large number of instruments (Hill et
al. 2011, p. 470). Further, the LIML estimator has a more symmetric distribution and
converges to normality faster than the 2SLS estimator. Though we have a few instruments,
we employ the LIML approach as the LIML estimators converge to normality faster.
The historical monthly time-series data for all variables from October 2006 to July 2014
are obtained from several sources. The data period starting from October 2006 is chosen
to evaluate the effect of SLA 2006 on the softwood lumber market in the U.S. Unlike the
previous studies which included trade policy variables as time dummies, this study employs
the observed monthly data of the export tax as a continuous explanatory variable. Most
of the historical data on softwood lumber supply, demand, lumber composite price, export
tax, Canadian overseas lumber exports, and lumber inventories are gathered from various
monthly issues of Random Lengths Yardstick from 2006 to 2014. Canadian lumber exports
only from SLA included provinces, i.e., Option A and B provinces are incorporated into
the analysis. All nominal series of prices and wage rates are deflated by producer price
indices to derive real prices and wage rates. Table 5.3 tabulates the summary statistics of
the data employed to estimate equations (5.1) - (5.3). The average monthly export tax
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collected by Canada is US$16.63/mbf in 1982 dollars, which is roughly 11% of the average
lumber price in the SLA 2006 period. The Canadian lumber producers paid the maximum
export tax of 15% most of the months from the beginning of SLA 2006 to mid 2012. As
the prevailing monthly price has been more than $355 since January 2013 (except August,
September and October 2013), free trade of softwood lumber prevails for most months from
the last two years.
Table 5.3: Summary statistics of the data (before log-transformation)
Variable Unit Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
qst mmbf 94 2255.18 342.16 1558.00 3041.00
qdt mmbf 94 3068.01 583.14 2185.00 4648.00
qct mmbf 94 789.65 239.83 510.00 1534.79
pt $/mbf 94 154.84 24.28 115.65 214.74
etart $/mbf 94 16.63 8.66 0.00 27.37
coext mmbf 94 327.71 118.71 122.00 561.00
vt mmbf 94 1242.83 83.00 1022.00 1401.00
vct mmbf 94 2927.98 402.26 2401.00 3940.00
ptimt 1982=100 94 220.34 16.27 181.30 242.00
ptimct 2002=100 94 93.40 6.99 85.30 111.30
wst $/hour 94 8.98 0.65 8.13 10.43
wct C$/hour 94 30.16 3.20 23.91 39.20
rt % 94 1.59 1.39 0.33 5.00
rct % 94 2.08 1.08 0.99 4.67
ht 1000s 94 851.27 295.93 478.00 1649.00
pbt 1982=100 94 189.72 5.67 179.60 197.10
xct C$/US$ 94 1.05 0.07 0.96 1.26
rect 0 or 1 94 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
One might wonder if there are issues involving non-stationarity and cointegration since
we employ monthly time-series data to estimate the system of equations. In order to address
the issue of non-stationarity, the cointegration test and multivariate vector autoregression
methods are often used (Baek 2012; Nagubadi and Zhang 2013; Parajuli et al. 2015). How-
ever, as stated by Hsiao (1997a, 1997b) and Al-Ballaa (2005), the reduced-form estimation
approach is perfectly valid to estimate an equation with or without non-stationary data as
long as the variables are cointegrated. Song et al. (2011) also applied the similar approach
to estimate the U.S. softwood lumber market using monthly time-series data without test-
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ing for unit-roots of each variable. We also follow the approach of Song et al. (2011) and
apply the residual-based cointegration test in order to investigate the unit-roots of residuals
in each equation.
5.6 Results and Discussion
Table 5.4 reports the LIML estimates of the simultaneous system of demand and supply
equations for the U.S. softwood lumber market. Most of the variables are statistically
significant at the 5% level. The associated signs of the estimated coefficients in all equations
are consistent with the economic theory. Since all variables but dummy variables are log-
transformed, the estimated coefficients represent the elasticity values. Among 12 lags of
dependent variables specified in equation (5.1) - (5.3), only statistically significant lags
are included in the final estimation of the equations.3 In terms of model specification
tests, the test for over-identifying restrictions cannot reject the hypothesis that the surplus
instruments employed in each equation are valid. Moreover, the test for the white-noise
of residuals indicates that the autoregressive specification of each equation addresses the
problem of autocorrelation. Likewise, the residual based Augmented Dicky-Fuller test
(Hsiao 1997a, 1997b, Al-Balla 2005) for the unit-root property of the residuals rejects the
hypothesis that the errors are non-stationary, which clearly negates the spuriousness of our
results due to data non-stationary.
The statistically significant own-price elasticity value of 0.55 (even 95% upper bound
is less than one) in the U.S. supply equation suggests that the softwood lumber supply is
price inelastic (Table 5.4). Other important variables which explain the supply schedule of
the softwood lumber such as timber price, lumber inventory, wage rate for sawmill workers
and interest rate have significant coefficient estimates with expected signs. However, the
estimated coefficients associated with the Canadian export supply function are quite dif-
ferent. The own-price elasticity value is elastic and statistically significant with the value
3The significant lags of dependent variables and monthly dummies in each equation are not presented
in the table 4 in order to save the space. The detailed LIML estimation results of the equation (5.1) –
(5.3) are available upon request from the first author.
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of 1.26. The coefficient estimate of Canadian lumber inventory is elastic with the value of
1.7. The Canadian wage rate of sawmill workers, Canadian interest rate and exchange rate
are found to be statistically insignificant.
Table 5.4: LIML results of the system of equations: The U.S. softwood lumber market
Variable U.S. supply Canadian export U.S. demand






















Constant 0.12(1.66) −8.87∗∗(2.08) 5.46∗∗(1.44)
R-squared 0.853 0.812 0.907
External instruments 2 2 3
Cragg-Donald F-stata 15.15 18.59 15.33
Test of overidentifying
restrictionsb 0.82 [0.37] 0.63 [0.43] 1.29 [0.28]
Portmanteau test for white
noise at 12 lags 16.73 [0.16] 16.52 [0.17] 5.67 [0.93]
The residual ADF testc −4.74[0.00] −3.49[0.00] −9.40[0.00]
∗ and ∗∗ denote the statistical significance of the estimates at 10% and 5% level respectively
Values in parenthesis and brackets are standard errors and P-values respectively.
aWe reject the null hypothesis that instruments are weak using the test size criterion that
nominal 5% test has size at most 10%.
bBasmann F-test.
cAugmented Dickey-Fuller tests of residuals.
In terms of lumber demand, the own-price elasticity of the lumber price is very inelastic
with an estimated value of 0.18, which indicates that a 1% increase in the monthly lumber
price leads to a drop in the U.S. lumber demand by 0.18%. Moreover, the negative and
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significant coefficient associated with the global financial crisis of 2008 in the U.S. lumber
demand equation reveals that the financial crisis of 2008 affected the U.S. lumber market.
Similarly, housing starts in the demand equation is found to be positively related with the
U.S. softwood lumber demand which also captures the effects of macroeconomic conditions
and the U.S. housing market.
Despite the similarity in model-setup, the magnitude of the coefficient estimates values
in domestic supply and Canadian export supply equations in this study are found to be
much higher than the values estimated by Song et al.(2011). The own-price elasticity value
in the domestic supply model is almost three times larger here (0.55 versus 0.16) and the
price elasticity value in the Canadian export supply equation is almost five times (1.26
versus 0.27) larger than the corresponding estimates in Song et al. (2011). Moreover, we
find higher elasticity estimates associated with U.S. and Canadian timber prices, and U.S.
and Canadian lumber inventory compared to the results of Song et al. (2011). These
disparities can be attributed to the different data sample employed to estimate the models.
While Song et al. (2011) included 200 monthly observations from early 1990 to 2006, our
estimation mainly focused on the SLA 2006 period. Our results suggest that the softwood
lumber supply schedules in the last seven years behaved quite differently. As depicted by
the significant coefficient estimates of the global financial crisis and housing starts, the
softwood lumber market during the study period was primarily affected by the financial
crisis and the U.S. housing market.
Even though past studies reported that SLA 2006 is able to restrict the Canadian lum-
ber shipments to the U.S., the empirical findings presented in Table 5.4 indicate that SLA
2006 had minimal eefcts on the U.S. softwood lumber market (Table 5.4). The estimated
coefficient of the export tax (etart) in the U.S. domestic supply equation is statistically
significant with a low value of 0.018 which indicates that the lumber supply in the U.S.
increases by only 0.018% if the export tax ($/mbf) increases by 1%. On the other hand,
contrary to theory and expectation, the export tax variable in the estimated model of Cana-
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dian export supply to the U.S. is found to be statistically insignificant. While Canadian
producers have paid the maximum monthly export tax of 15% on their lumber shipments
to the U.S. from the beginning of SLA 2006 to mid 2012 (Random Lengths 2014), the
limited effects of the export tax on the lumber supply in both countries are not as ex-
pected. The higher export tax during this period was mainly explained by the fact that
the monthly prevailing lumber price in the U.S. was below the $315/mbf threshold in most
of the months.
The quantity of the Canadian overseas lumber exports is found to be insignificant in
the U.S. domestic lumber supply equation, indicating that Canada’s other export markets
do not directly influence the U.S. domestic lumber supply. It also implies that the recent
expansion of Canadian lumber export markets doesn’t influence the domestic lumber sup-
ply in the U.S. However, the coext variable has a negative coefficient in the equation of
the Canadian export supply to the US suggesting that a 1% increase in overseas exports
ultimately decreases Canadian export supply to the U.S. by 0.14%. This is consistent with
the expectation that as an increase in the Canadian overseas shipments diverts softwood
lumber exports from the U.S. to overseas. It also implies that any changes in the softwood
lumber market in Asia could affect Canadian lumber shipments to the U.S.
One might wonder what happened to the Canadian lumber exports from Maritime
provinces and other SLA-excluded companies after the implementation of SLA 2006. We
scrutinized the monthly quantity of softwood lumber shipped from SLA-excluded provinces
and companies during the SLA period. We found that lumber shipments from these regions
to the U.S. has not fluctuated much throughout the period. The percentage share of the
exports from these regions remains to be an average of 14% with monthly export quantity
of about 120 thousand mbf. The maximum percentage of lumber exports from this region
was 20% in April 2011 and the lowest percentage share 9% in January 2008.
The structure of SLA 2006, and the macro-economic situations during SLA 2006 period
help explain the ineffectiveness of SLA 2006 on softwood lumber trade between the U.S.
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and Canada. The crux of SLA 2006 is to limit Canadian lumber shipments to the U.S.
by increasing the lumber price. The variable-rate export tax was specified as a policy
instrument to raise the lumber price. However, the variation in the rate of export tax from
5 to 15% is only limited to the prevailing lumber price between $315 and $355. With the
same 15% export charge for the price below $315, the lower the prevailing lumber price,
the lower the per mbf export charge in dollar amount incurred by the Canadian lumber
producers and the less influence of the export tax on the lumber trade. On the other hand,
the U.S. economy experienced a housing market bust which in turn resulted in the great
financial crisis of 2008-09, and it is still recovering. The average monthly lumber price from
October 2006 to March 2012 was around US$265 with the lowest value of $195 in March
2009. Given that the housing market was the major factor determining the lumber price in
the U.S., even the maximum export charge of 15% specified by SLA 2006 could not raise
the prevailing lumber price in the U.S.
5.7 Conclusions
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the latest trade agreement in the softwood
lumber market in the U.S. and Canada, this study estimates supply and demand models
for the softwood lumber market by employing historical monthly data from October 2006
to July 2014. Given that SLA 2006 is about to expire and both countries are looking for
ways forward, this study provides useful insights on the lumber trade dispute between two
otherwise friendly neighboring nations.
The LIML estimates of supply and demand equations for the softwood lumber market
show that the Canadian lumber exports from the SLA included provinces are price elastic,
yet U.S. domestic lumber supply is price inelastic. It clearly indicates that the monthly
lumber composite price alters the quantity of Canadian lumber exports to the U.S., but
U.S. domestic supply schedule is less affected by the change in the lumber composite price.
More importantly, the findings of this study reveal that the effects of the export tax on the
U.S. softwood lumber market are quite limited. Contrary to the results of past studies, the
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export tax is found to be ineffective in reducing the Canadian softwood lumber shipments
to the U.S. during the SLA 2006 period. Canadian overseas exports, however, suggest
that, in the future these overseas markets will gain in importance while the trade dispute
between the U.S. and Canada will receive less attention from Canadians.
Given that SLA 2006 is going to expire in 2015, it is time for both countries to start
looking for ways forward. Once again, U.S. lumber producers will most likely argue and
lobby against the free trade of softwood lumber between the two countries. Even though
SLA 2006 is not able to effectively restrict Canadian exports to the U.S., both parties
happily agreed to extend SLA 2006 for two more years in 2012. With the imposition of
SLA 2006, both countries got essentially what they wanted. For the U.S., it appeared
that the lumber prices increased as a result of the export tax. For Canada, the export
tax had almost no effect on the quantity of lumber exported, thus satisfying the concerns
about domestic employment. In addition, the Canadian government was able to collect a
substantial amount of export charge, enabling them to do things that would not have been
possible otherwise. One might speculate whether this is one of the reasons that provincial
governments in Canada are reluctant to switch to an auction-bid pricing system that would
once and for all solve this trade dispute. In the meantime, the minimal effects of SLA
2006 on softwood lumber trade have also been able to satisfy the National Association
of Home Builders, a representative group of lumber consumers in the U.S. Under these
circumstances, a continuation of SLA 2006 would be a win-win and prudent step to resolve
the issue at least temporarily without substantial harm to either side in the days to come.
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Chapter 6
The United States-Canada Softwood Lumber
Agreement 2006: An Actual versus Optimal Export
Tax
6.1 Introduction
The U.S.-Canada softwood lumber trade dispute has been a major political issue be-
tween the United States (U.S.) and Canada over the last several decades. It is one of the
largest inter-county trade debates, as two to three billion dollars of softwood lumber are
traded between the two countries. The different forestland ownership system in the U.S.
and Canada is believed to be the main underlying reason for the trade dispute between
two friendly nations. Almost 60% of forests in the U.S. are owned by the private sector,
and competitive auction-bid market determines the timber price. However, around 95% of
Canadian forests are under the ownership of federal and provincial governments (Abboushi
2010), and Canadian provincial governments determine the timber price administratively
(Zhang 2007). Pointing to the administrative pricing system of Canada, U.S. lumber pro-
ducers argue that the stumpage price in Canada has been subsidized and that subsidized
Canadian lumber shipments are dumped in the U.S. market. In order to resolve this trade
debate, there have been several temporary bilateral agreements since the late 1980s includ-
ing the five-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the period of 1987-1991, the
Softwood Lumber Agreement 1996 for the period of 1996-2001, and the Softwood Lumber
Agreement (SLA) 2006 for the period of 2006-2015.
SLA 2006 is a prevailing transitory agreement between the U.S. and Canada that
limits Canadian lumber exports to the U.S. It is a price-driven ad-valorem export tax
rate coupled with a quota system. SLA 2006 specifies two options to Canadian lumber
exporting provinces to the U.S. Option A is a variable rate of export charge ranging from
0-15% of the prevailing monthly price, and option B entails an export charge of 0-5%
combined with a volume restraint (SLA 2006). Alberta and British Columbia, the two
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major Canadian lumber-producing provinces, choose option A, while other provinces such
as Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Ontario and Quebec follow option B of SLA 2006. The rate of
the Canadian export tax and/or volume restraint is primarily a function of the prevailing
monthly price. The prevailing monthly price, as defined in SLA 2006, is the four-week
average of the Random Lengths framing lumber composite prices available 21 days before
the beginning of the month to which the prevailing monthly price will be applied. If the
prevailing monthly price is more than $US 355/mbf, free trade of softwood lumber prevails
between the U.S. and Canada.
The main purpose of this study is to determine the optimal export tax under the frame-
work of SLA 2006 using game-theoretic tools and uncover empirical evidence supporting
our theoretical insights. While past studies reported that SLA 2006 has been able to re-
strict the Canadian lumber shipments to the U.S., a recent empirical study by Parajuli
et al. (2015) revealed that the export tax under SLA 2006 had no effect on the softwood
lumber trade between the U.S. and Canada. Since SLA 2006 is going to expire in 2015,
both countries have already started looking for ways forward. While Canada is reported to
be in favor of extending SLA 2006, the U.S. counterparts are against the continuation of
the current agreement (Campebll Global 2014). Under these circumstances, it seems quite
pertinent to investigate whether the export tax rate of 0-15% under SLA 2006 is econom-
ically optimal from both countries’ perspectives. This study first develops a two-country
two-stage model by considering the capacity-constraint scenario of the U.S. domestic lum-
ber production, and computes the optimum export tax rate of the U.S.-Canada softwood
lumber trade. Further, we estimate the monthly rate of optimal export tax by using the
formula devised from the theoretical analysis, and compare it with the corresponding actual
monthly export tax that Canadian producers have been paying according to SLA 2006.
The two-country two-stage model developed in this article shows that the rate of op-
timum export tax under the framework of SLA 2006 is primarily determined by the level
of U.S. softwood lumber production capacity, per unit lumber production costs in Canada,
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and linear demand parameters. The higher the level of U.S. production capacity and Cana-
dian lumber production costs, the lower the level of the optimum export tax. Our empirical
estimation reveals that during the period of SLA 2006 the monthly export tax ranges from
negative 23% to positive 30% with an average monthly export tax of 7%. Given that SLA
2006 is going to expire in 2015, the findings of this study provide useful information in the
country-level bargaining and trade negotiation process between the U.S. and Canada.
6.2 A Historical Overview of the Trade Dispute
Since the late 1980s, there have been several temporary bilateral trade agreements
between the U.S. and Canada with an objective of limiting the Canadian market share in
the U.S. softwood lumber market. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between
the U.S. and Canada was the first five-year agreement for the period of 1987-1991. It
provisioned that Canadian provincial governments either had to levy a 15% export tax on
their lumber shipments to the U.S. or had to increase the prevailing stumpage prices in
Canada. Another short-term agreement was the Softwood Lumber Agreement 1996, which
was a tariff-regulated quota system of Canadian exports for the period of 1996-2001. It
specified annual duty-free export quotas of 14.7 billion board feet (bbf) of Canadian lumber
shipments to the U.S. For exports quantities of over 14.7 bbf, SLA 1996 provisioned US$50-
$100 per mbf of the export fee on Canadian exports. Likewise, SLA 2006 is a variable rate
price-driven export tax of 0-15% coupled with an export quota system for the period of
late 2006-2015. Besides these bilateral agreements, the U.S. Department of Commerce had
placed various unilateral import tariff duties including Countervailing duties (CVDs) and
Antidumping (AD) tariffs during the turmoil periods of 1991-1996 and 2001-2006. Those
CVDs and ADs were province-specific variable rates ranging from the low of 2.11% to 32%.
A number of studies have expounded on the U.S. softwood lumber market, Canadian
lumber exports to the U.S. and effects of past trade restriction measures on the overall
lumber market as well as the total social welfare in both countries. Some early studies
which explored the U.S. softwood lumber market and Canadian lumber exports using dif-
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ferent modeling approaches and econometric estimation techniques were Buongiorno et al.
(1979); McCarl and Haynes (1985); Adams et al. (1986); Buongiorno et al. (1988) and
Sarkar et al. (1993). Likewise several studies primarily investigated how effective trade
protection measures were under prevailing market conditions. Using the Spatial and par-
tial equilibrium analysis approaches, early studies by Boyd and Krutilla (1987), Chen et
al. (1988), Wear and Lee (1993), and Myneni et al. (1994) assessed the market and total
welfare effects of the 1986 MOU. Likewise, Lindsey et al. (2000), Zhang (2001), Zhang
(2006), and Baek and Yin (2006) specifically evaluated the market and welfare effects of
SLA 1996, and reported that SLA 1996 was quite effective in limiting the Canadian lumber
exports to the U.S. Similarly, several studies examined the effects of the U.S. retaliatory
CVDs and ADs on Canadian lumber imports in the post-SLA 1996 period from 2001 to
2006 (Adams 2003; Devadoss et al. 2005; Devadoss 2006; Mogus et al. 2006; Song et al.
2011).
Only a few studies have evaluated the impacts of SLA 2006 on the softwood lumber
trade between two countries. Baek (2011) and (2012) found a significant negative long-
term effect of SLA 2006 on U.S. lumber imports from Canada. A recent study by Nagubadi
and Zhang (2013) also reported that SLA 2006 has been able to reduce U.S. imports of
softwood lumber by 11.2%. Moreover, using the simulation approach of the world lumber
market, van Kooten and Johnston (2014) projected that with the removal of the export
tax on Canadian lumber exports to the U.S., Canadian lumber production would rise by
3.2 million m3 (1.36 billion board feet), while U.S. lumber production would decrease by 1
million m3 (420 million board feet). A drop by 1 million m3 is, however, only about 1.5% of
the roughly 30 billion board feet annual U.S. domestic production. Likewise, the change in
welfare would be moderate: the net loss to U.S. lumber producers would be $112 million,
but the U.S. consumers could gain $107 million..
While most of the past studies investigated the welfare aspects of trade policies under
the framework of the U.S-Canada softwood lumber trade, only a handful of studies assessed
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the alternative as well as optimal aspects of trade policy instruments in prevailing market
scenarios. Employing the concept of forest rents and methods of rent capture, Van Kooten
(2002) compared the possible market implications of SLA 1996, a Canadian export tax, and
U.S. import tariffs. He revealed that the best policy option for Canadian lumber producers
would be the export quota as provisioned in SLA 1996, because the quota rent they acquired
would clearly outweigh the loss of producer surplus due to the imposition of the export
quota limit. Van Kooten (2002) also determined the optimal level of export quota of
softwood lumber from the perspectives of Canadian producers, and showed that the U.S
lumber demand, Canadian lumber supply and transportation costs primarily determined
the level of optimal export quota. Likewise, Kinnucan and Zhang (2004) simply defined
the optimal export tax rate as the reciprocal of the excess demand elasticity in the U.S.
Their empirical illustration depicted that the optimal export tax was 77% as opposed to the
export tax of 35% imposed by Canada under SLA 1996. Similarly, employing a vertically
interrelated log-lumber model, Devadoss (2008) examined the appropriate level of U.S.
CVDs in retaliating against the presumed Canadian subsidy policies during the period of
2001-2006. His empirical findings revealed that the U.S. could levy a CVD 1.55 times the
Canadian subsidy to nullify the adverse affects of the Canadian production subsidy.
6.3 Two-Stage Two-Player Game
We consider strategic aspects of trade policy to set up a two-player sequential game
of the softwood lumber trade between the U.S. and Canada. Strategic trade policy is an
application of oligopoly theory, which accounts for the strategic interactions between firms
in actual or potential international trade markets (Spencer and Brander 2008). We develop
a two-stage game of the softwood lumber trade in which the U.S. is assumed as the home
country and Canada as the foreign country.
While the U.S. is the largest lumber producer in the world, it does not produce enough
softwood lumber to satisfy its domestic demand. More than 95% of the U.S. softwood
lumber imports come from Canada which represents roughly one-third of the total U.S.
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consumption (Random Lengths 2014). Taking this situation into account, we assume that
the U.S. has a capacity constraint in domestic softwood lumber production, and can produce
only x amount of lumber at full capacity. In the residual demand portion of the softwood
lumber market in the U.S., Canada acts as a monopolist and exports the y quantity of
softwood lumber1. The strategy space of the U.S. firm is [0, x), and the Canadian firm has
a strategy space of [0,∞). We also assume that the U.S. firm has constant production cost
of cus per mbf, and the Canadian firm has constant cost of cca per mbf. The difference in
marginal costs of production accounts for the national difference in production efficiency
of sawmills as well as the resource endowments. Transportation costs are ignored for
simplicity. We assume that both Canadian and U.S. firms produce similar softwood lumber
of homogenous quality. Consequently, consumers in the U.S. are indifferent to the lumber
source, and a single representative price (P) represents the softwood lumber market. Let
the linear inverse linear demand function be:
P = P (Q) = a− b(x+ y) (6.1)
where a and b are linear demand parameters and always positive, and P (Q) = 0 for Q ≥ a.
This game is a two-stage sequential game, in which, we assume that the U.S. plays a leader’s
role, and we set up the two stages of the sequential game as:
1. The two governments i.e. Canada and the U.S. negotiate and set the level of export
tax t2 imposed on the Canadian lumber shipments to the U.S. While the U.S. is no
longer able to alter its level of the production above x due to its capacity-constraint,
the U.S. uses the rate of export tax t as a bargaining tool during the trade negotiation
process.
2. Assuming t as given, Canada maximizes the monopoly profits in the residual portion
of the U.S. softwood lumber demand.
1We ignore the role of other import partners of the U.S., as they accounted for only 5% of the U.S.
total lumber imports.
2For simplicity, we only consider Option A of the SLA. British Columbia and Alberta, which follows
Option A of the agreement, export 66% of the total shipments during the SLA 2006 period
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Following the standard backward induction method, in the second stage, Canada maximizes
its monopoly profits on the residual portion of the U.S. lumber demand. The profit function
of the Canadian firm is specified as:
πca = (1− t)y(a− bx− by)− ccay (6.2)
















The condition (6.4) reveals that the price of softwood lumber has a positive relationship
with all three factors, (a− bx), cca, and t.
Remark 1: The lumber price and Canadian lumber exports to the U.S. depend on linear
demand parameters a and b, per unit production costs of softwood lumber in Canada, and
the rate of the export tax as provisioned in SLA 2006. The export tax leads to rise in the
lumber price, but causes a drop in Canadian lumber exports to the U.S.
In the first stage, two governments negotiate and set the optimal export tax under
which U.S. maximizes the domestic social welfare. In order to calculate the total U.S.
social welfare, we need to calculate the consumer surplus and producer profit. The total
social welfare G(US) in the U.S. is computed as (refer to Appendix B for the computation




















Solving the FOC of condition (6.5) for the optimal export tax results in:




Remark 2: The optimal rate of the export tax is mainly determined by linear demand pa-
rameters, the U.S. softwood lumber production capacity, and the per unit lumber production
costs in Canada. The higher the magnitude of U.S. production capacity and the Canadian
lumber production costs, the lower the level of the export tax.
In equation (6.6), the effects of both variables, cca and x on the export tax are as
expected and consistent with economic theories. Obviously, an increase in the production
costs in Canada limits the relative competitive advantage of Canadian lumber producers.
Further, production costs also capture the efficiency level of the industry as well as resource
endowments. Being a less efficient lumber industry and a drop in the lumber inventory
level would undoubtedly hurt Canada in the lumber trade with the U.S. McNabb (2004)
also reported that raising Canadian lumber production costs would be a prime solution
of the U.S.-Canada softwood lumber trade in the short-run. Likewise, When the U.S.
domestic production capacity increases i.e. when the sawmill industry expands, they can
alter their level of production as per the domestic market demand. Once the U.S. domestic
consumption depends less on the Canadian softwood shipments to the U.S., the level of the
restriction on the Canadian softwood lumber exports to the U.S. would be less relevant.
6.4 Empirical Estimation
This section focuses on the empirical estimation of the theoretical results presented in
the previous section. Based on the historical monthly time-series data during the period of
SLA 2006, we estimate the monthly optimal export tax (t∗) by employing equation (6.6). In
order to calculate the monthly t∗, we require monthly data on Canadian softwood lumber
production costs (cca), U.S. softwood lumber production capacity (x), and linear demand
parameters a and b. We use total variable costs for British Columbia (BC) Interior softwood
lumber mills as a proxy of Canadian softwood lumber production costs. The historical
data on total variable costs for BC mills are obtained from RISI, the leading information
provider for the global forest products industry (www.risiinfo.com). Further, we generate
the data series on U.S. lumber production capacity by using the capacity utilization rate
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of the U.S. sawmill industry (NAICS 321-1) and U.S. actual softwood lumber production
(Table 6.1). The main issue of calculating the optimal export tax is the estimation of linear
parameters a and b. Hence we use an econometric approach to estimate the values of a
and b. By considering the framework of the aggregate softwood lumber price as specified in
equation (6.1), we estimate a reduced-form econometric model of the U.S. softwood lumber
market. We combine (x) and qca to estimate the value of a and b which is in line with
equation (6.1).
The aggregate reduced-form econometric model of the U.S. softwood lumber market is
specified as:
pt =α0 + α1(xt + qct) + α2pbt + α3xct + α4wst + α5wct + α6ht + α7novt+
α8dect + α9jant + α10febt + α11pt−1 + α12pt−2 + · · ·+ α22pt−12 + εt
(6.7)
We incorporate other lumber demand and supply variables in the aggregate price model
to control the effects of those variables on estimates of a and b. Table 6.1 presents the de-
tailed description of each variable and their respective data sources. Most of the data on
softwood lumber market including softwood lumber price, lumber production, Canadian
lumber exports are obtained from various monthly issues of Random Lengths YardStick.
pt represents the Random Lengths monthly composite lumber price, which is a weighted
average of 15 key framing lumber prices in the U.S. and Canada (Random Lengths 2013).
Since data on U.S. softwood lumber production capacity (xt) are not readily available, we
generate the historical monthly data series of (xt) by using the U.S. total softwood lumber
production and the capacity utilization rate of the sawmill industry (Utit). As RisiInfo
reports the lumber production costs data quarterly only, we use the cubic spline interpola-
tion approach3 to convert the quarterly data into monthly frequency. We include nov, dec,
jan, and feb as monthly dummy variables for November, December, January and February
respectively to capture the seasonal effects. In order to address the autocorrelation issue in
3We use the MATLAB built-in command ’spline’ to generate monthly data of production costs based
on the quarterly data.
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the dynamic model, up to 12 lags of lumber price are included in the equation. As we focus
our empirical estimation on the period of SLA 2006, we employed historical monthly data
for all variables from October 2006 to December 2013. Table 6.2 presents the summary
statistics of the monthly data employed to estimate the empirical model of equation (6.7).
Table 6.1: Variables, their descriptions and sources (2006:10 - 2013:12)
Variable Description Source
pt Lumber composite price
a Random Lengthsb
qct Canadian lumber exports to the U.S. Random Lengths
coext Canadian overseas lumber exports Random Lengths
vct Canadian lumber inventory Random Lengths
xt U.S. domestic lumber production: sum of Random Lengths
production from U.S. South, U.S. West
(Inland and Coast)
Utit Capacity utilization rate of NAICS 321-1 U.S. Census Bureau
xt U.S. softwood lumber production capacity xt/Utit
pbt Price index of common building bricks U.S. BLS
xct Canadian-U.S. dollar exchange rate USDA Economic
Research Service
wst Wage rate of U.S. sawmill workers U.S. BLS
wct Wage rate of Canadian sawmill workers Statistics Canada
ht Housing starts in the U.S.-seasonally adjusted U.S. Census Bureau
annual rate
ccat Softwood lumber production cost in RISI Info
B.C. interior
aRandom Lengths lumber composite price
bVarious monthly issues of Random Lengths Yardstick (2006-2013)
cU.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
Since Canadian export supply to the U.S. (qct ) and softwood lumber price (pt) are
endogenously determined, the issue of endogeneity emerges while empirically estimating
the equation (6.7). Since ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is inconsistent in the
presence of an endogenous regressor, several instrument variable estimation methods such
as two-stage least squares (2SLS) and limited information maximum likelihood (LIML)
are commonly applied to deal with the endogeneity problem. While the 2SLS method is
widely applied, the LIML approach performs better in the presence of weak and/or a large
number of instruments (Hill et al. 2011, p. 470). Further, the LIML estimator has a more
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symmetric distribution and converges to normality faster than the 2SLS estimator. Though
we have few instruments, we employ the LIML approach as the LIML estimators converge
to normality faster.
Table 6.2: Summary statistics of the data (2006:10-2013:12)
Variable Unit Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
pt $/mbf 87 152.47 23.61 115.65 214.74
qct mmbf 87 907.31 265.72 576.00 1715.00
coext mmbf 87 320.98 116.81 122.00 561.00
vct mmbf 87 2912.42 410.88 2401.00 3940.00
xt mmbf 87 3632.81 405.61 2475.85 4390.08
pbt 1982=100 87 190.09 5.74 179.60 197.10
xct C$/US$ 87 1.08 0.07 0.98 1.31
wst $/hour 87 9.00 0.66 8.14 10.43
wct C$/hour 87 30.11 3.25 23.91 39.20
ht 1000s 87 841.26 304.83 478.00 1649.00
ccat $/mbf 78 112.10 14.29 85.84 139.21
Table 6.3 reports the LIML estimates of the softwood lumber price equation. A linear
functional form is used. Most of the estimated coefficients have expected signs and are
statistically significant at the 5% level. Among 12 lags of dependent variables specified
in equation (6.7), only statistically significant lags are included in the final estimation of
the model. In terms of model specification tests, the test for over-identifying restrictions
fails to reject the hypothesis that the surplus instruments employed in the model are valid.
Moreover, the test for the white-noise of the residuals indicates that the autoregressive
specification of the equation addresses the problem of the autocorrelation. Likewise, the
residual based Augmented Dicky-Fuller test (Hsiao 1997; Al-Balla 2005) for the unit-root
property of the residuals rejects the hypothesis that the errors are non-stationary.
The results show that after controlling for other supply and demand factors, the esti-
mated values of linear demand parameters i.e. a and b are 167.19 and 0.0126 respectively.
Using these estimated values of a and b in equation (6.7) , we calculate the optimal export
tax rate for each month during the period of the SLA 2006. Figure 6.1 presents the monthly
optimum export tax for Canadian softwood lumber exports to the U.S. For a comparison
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purpose, Figure 6.1 also reports the actual export tax rate that Canadian lumber producers
have been paying according to SLA 2006.
Table 6.3: LIML results of the softwood lumber price equation (2006:10-2013:12)
Variable Coefficient estimate Std. error
Intercept 167.185∗∗ 73.42
U.S. production Capacity + Canadian export
supply (xt + qct) 0.0126
∗∗ 0.006
U.S. price of bricks (pbt) −1.286∗∗ 0.32
U.S.-Canada dollar Exchange rate (xct) −65.046∗∗ 22.41
U.S. wage rate (wst) 13.556
∗∗ 3.55
Canadian wage rate (wct) 0.272 0.37
Housing starts (ht) 0.012
∗ 0.006
First lag of lumber price (pt−1) 0.990
∗∗ 0.10







First-stage Cragg-Donald F-statistics a 10.93
Test of overidentifying restrictions b [P-value] 0.037[0.85]
Portmanteau (Q) test for white
noise at 12 lags [P-value] 12.21[0.43]
The residual based ADF test c [P-value] −5.90[0.00]
∗ and ∗∗ denote the statistical significance of the estimates at 10% and 5% level respectively.
aWe reject the null hypothesis that instruments are weak using the test size criterion that
nominal 5% test has size at most 10%.
bBasmann F-test.
cAugmented Dickey-Fuller tests of residuals.
While the actual export tax under SLA 2006 varies only from 0 to 15%, the calculated
optimum export tax ranges widely from negative 23% in October 2006 to 30% in the month
of December 2008. The optimum monthly export tax is found to be negative during the
early period from October 2006 to December 2007 and after 2012. However, Canadian
lumber producers paid a constant rate of 15% export tax from the beginning of SLA 2006
to mid 2011. Recently, the actual export tax was zero since the prevailing monthly lumber
price was above US$355.
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Figure 6.1: The actual export tax rate according to the SLA 2006 versus the optimum
export tax rate
Since we use the constant estimated linear parameters a and b, the Canadian lumber
production costs (cca) and the U.S. lumber production capacity (x) are the major determi-
nants of the optimum export tax. Of these two variables, the primary factor determining
the optimum export tax is found to be cca. As we can see in Figure 6.2, the monthly
value of x fluctuated around the constant mean value of approximately 3.6 billion board
feet. However, the magnitude of cca was around US$136 (in 1982 dollars) in 2007, but it
dropped to US$ 86 (in 1982 dollars) in 2008, and it gradually increased after 2010. Hence,
it clearly indicates that the higher the Canadian production costs, the lower (or negative)
the optimum export tax for Canadian exports to the U.S.
Given that the linear parameters of the inverse demand function are affected by several
market factors including change in lumber consumers’ preferences, forest regulations, and
technological changes, we conduct the sensitivity analysis by altering the magnitudes of
a and b. We consider both rise and drop in values of a and b by 20%, and calculate the
optimum export tax for each scenario. Table 6.4 reports the optimal export tax associated
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Figure 6.2: U.S. softwood lumber production capacity and the Canadian lumber production
costs (2006:10-2013:12)
with several combinations of changes in the values of a and b. An upward shift in the linear
demand curve leads to a rise in the optimal export tax, and a downward shift decreases
the level of export tax substantially. We found that changes in the value of a have a linear
effect on the optimal level of export tax. An increase in a by 20% raises the optimum
export tax by around 20%, and a 20% decrease in a causes a drop in the optimal export
tax by around 20%. However, changes in the slope of the demand curve have opposite
effects on the optimal level of export tax. An increase in b leads to a drop, and a decrease
in b causes a rise in the optimal level of export tax. Unlike the effects of changes in a,
the effects of b are not linear. A 20% rise in slope of the demand curve decreases the the
optimal export tax by almost 7%.
6.5 Discussion and Conclusions
This study determines the optimal level of export tax under the framework of SLA
2006 by developing a two-country two-stage game. By considering the capacity-constraint
scenario of U.S. domestic production, this study assumes that Canada plays a monopoly
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Table 6.4: Sensitivity analysis: changes in the optimal export tax in response to changes
in a and b
Month 20% increase in a 20% decrease in a 20% increase in b 20% decrease in b
a = 200.62 a = 133.75 b = 0.015 b = 0.010
Dec-06 14.85 -46.59 -15.23 -1.14
Mar-07 12.75 -55.52 -21.67 -3.39
Jun-07 9.59 -62.99 -27.31 -7.06
Sep-07 14.71 -45.12 -14.25 -1.38
Dec-07 20.30 -31.74 -4.12 5.06
Mar-08 33.73 -11.60 12.02 21.17
Jun-08 37.72 -8.52 14.84 26.08
Sep-08 40.07 -4.10 18.27 28.86
Dec-08 44.17 7.14 26.67 33.53
Mar-09 37.78 -7.51 15.53 26.12
Jun-09 32.72 -20.17 6.01 20.28
Sep-09 28.21 -28.16 -0.24 14.95
Dec-09 31.80 -16.05 8.63 18.93
Mar-10 36.88 -8.50 14.70 25.02
Jun-10 33.09 -18.80 7.01 20.69
Sep-10 35.00 -14.45 10.31 22.92
Dec-10 33.59 -18.34 7.42 21.30
Mar-11 30.08 -26.62 1.16 17.23
Jun-11 28.40 -30.17 -1.55 15.26
Sep-11 29.07 -27.40 0.44 15.99
Dec-11 31.38 -20.47 5.55 18.61
Mar-12 28.16 -30.12 -1.57 14.97
Jun-12 27.43 -28.41 -0.56 13.96
Sep-12 25.69 -31.30 -2.85 11.89
Dec-12 23.34 -33.74 -4.94 9.03
Mar-13 15.18 -51.92 -18.77 -0.48
role on the residual portion of the U.S. domestic lumber demand. Findings reveal that
the optimum export tax is determined by Canadian lumber production costs, U.S. lumber
production capacity and linear demand parameters. Using the theoretical findings, this
study also calculates the monthly optimal export tax during the SLA 2006 period, and
compares it with the actual rate of export tax that Canadian producers have been paying
according to SLA 2006. Given that SLA 2006 is expiring in 2015, and that U.S. producers
are against extending SLA 2006 in its current form, this study provides useful information
in the lobbying and trade negotiation process between the two countries.
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Based on both theoretical findings and empirical estimation, it can be inferred that both
countries should be cognizant of the level of Canadian production costs and the production
capacity of U.S. sawmills along with the lumber demand parameters. Given that the state
of prevailing sawmill capacity cannot be altered substantially in the short run, the level of
Canadian lumber production costs plays a pivotal role in the determination of the optimum
export tax under the framework of SLA 2006. McNaab (2004) also reported that the level
of Canadian lumber production costs is a primary factor in the softwood lumber dispute
between the two countries. The empirical results depict that the monthly optimal export
tax during the period of SLA 2006 is between negative 23% and 30%, with a monthly
average of 7%. The sensitivity analyses reveal that both demand parameters can alter the
optimal rate of export tax substantially.
Obviously, the higher rate of the optimal export tax is just opposite of the free trade.
Given that U.S. lumber producers, most probably, will argue and lobby against the free
trade of softwood lumber between the two countries, we suggest both players to consider the
capacity-constraint scenario of the U.S. sawmills and efficiency of the Canadian lumber in-
dustry while negotiating for a new trade agreement. As Parajuli et al. (2015) reported, the
rate of export tax provisioned in SLA 2006 was ineffective in limiting the Canadian lumber
exports to the U.S., the results of this study provide important insights in understanding
the optimal state of the export tax.
While this paper applies a game-theoretic framework in the U.S.-Canada softwood lum-
ber trade, some research caveats are still in order. For the sake of simplicity, this study only
considers option A of SLA 2006, the export tax as a percentage of lumber price, and excludes
option B, the export tax coupled with export quota, from the analysis. The provinces which
follow option B of the agreement only represent around 20% of average monthly lumber
exports to the U.S. We consider a linear inverse demand function to simplify our math-
ematical derivations, though most of the past empirical studies formulated the softwood
lumber market model with a log-log model. Further, we assume a two-country trade model
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indicating that Canada is the only lumber trading partner of the U.S. However, around
5% of the U.S. lumber import market share is captured by Scanvandian countries, and the
Canadian overseas export market has been burgeoning in recent years. On the other hand,
we assume that both countries produce identical softwood lumber. The imported lumber
from Canada, however, specifically the spruce-pine-fir lumber group is different from the
U.S. domestic lumber in terms of quality (Nagubadi et al. 2004; Mogus et al. 2006). It
is worthwhile, therefore, that further studies should consider the concept of differentiated
softwood lumber while modeling the U.S.-Canada softwood lumber market. Moreover, as
this study determines the optimum level of export tax, the caveats of calculating optimum




The softwood lumber trade dispute between the U.S. and Canada has been a persistent
trade battle lasting more than three decades. Despite legal proceedings and arbitration
rulings from various organizations including NAFTA, WTO and LCIA, a long-term or
permanent resolution of this trade issue has yet to be found. The trade dispute between
the two neighboring nations is primarily driven by interest group politics and institutional
arrangements (Zhang 2007). The U.S. Lumber Coalition, a group of domestic lumber
producers, is a well-organized interest group in the U.S., and has been actively participating
in every political bargaining and negotiation process. The Canadian lumber producers, on
the other hand, are fragmented by provinces, and hardly able to maintain a united and
consistent position in the bilateral trade negotiation. SLA 2006 is the latest transitory
bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Canada to regulate the Canadian lumber exports
to the U.S, and is expiring in October 2015 unless both countries agree to extend it further.
By employing an approach of two-player game-theoretic model, this dissertation eval-
uates the effects of SLA 2006 on the softwood lumber trade between the U.S. and Canada.
The first study of the dissertation develops the two-player homogenous Cournot-Nash equi-
librium model, and examines the effects of the export tax on lumber production and trade
in both countries. The second study estimates the empirical models of the U.S. softwood
lumber market to uncover the results of game-theoretic analysis of the first study. And
the third study determines the optimum export tax under the framework of SLA 2006 by
developing a two-country two-stage game model. The optimum export tax is later esti-
mated by using the historical monthly data and compared with the actual export tax that
Canadian lumber producers have been paying according to SLA 2006.
The results of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium model reveal that the export tax provi-
sioned in SLA 2006 is able to restrict the Canadian lumber shipments to the U.S. However,
based on the historical data for the period of SLA 2006, the LIML estimates of the supply
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and demand equations for the U.S. softwood lumber market found that the export tax could
not affect the lumber trade between the two countries. The coefficient estimate associated
with the export tax is found to be statistically insignificant. The findings of the two-stage
game suggest that the optimal export tax under the framework of SLA 2006 is mainly de-
termined by the level of Canadian lumber production costs and the U.S. lumber production
capacity. The empirical estimation based on actual historical lumber market data reveals
that the monthly optimal export tax ranges widely from -23% to 30%. However, B.C. and
Alberta have been collecting a flat export tax rate of 15% most of the time during the
period of 2007-2011. Obviously, the higher rate of optimal export tax is just opposite of
free trade. Given that U.S. lumber producers, most probably, will argue and lobby against
free trade of softwood lumber between the two countries, both players should consider the
capacity-constraint scenario of the U.S. sawmills and efficiency of the Canadian lumber
industry while negotiating for the future trade agreement.
The limited influence of SLA 2006 on the lumber trade between the two countries
is primarily explained by the structure of SLA 2006 and the macro-economic situations
during the SLA 2006 period. The variation in the rate of export tax from 5 to 15% is
only limited to the prevailing lumber price between $315 and $355. With the same 15%
export charge for a price below $315, the lower the prevailing lumber price, the lower the
per mbf export charge in dollar amount incurred by the Canadian lumber producers and
so is the less influence of the export tax on the lumber trade. Hence, it is hard to believe
that the export tax can lead to an increase in the lumber price and ultimately affect the
Canadian lumber shipments to the U.S. On the other hand, the U.S. economy experienced
a housing market bust which in turn triggered the great financial crisis of 2008-09. Given
that the housing market is the primary determinant of the lumber price in the U.S., even
the maximum export charge of 15% could not raise the lumber price in the U.S.
While this dissertation applies game-theoretic analysis and econometric estimation to
evaluate the latest bilateral lumber trade agreement between the U.S. and Canada, some
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of the research limitations are still in order. For the sake of simplicity, this study only
considers option A of SLA 2006. Further, this study considers only two-country models,
though Canada exports a significant portion of its exports to overseas markets and the
U.S. also imports around 5% of softwood lumber from other countries. In addition, this
dissertation assumes that both countries produce identical softwood lumber, while few
previous studies reported that Canadian spruce-pine-fir lumber group is of different quality
than the lumber from U.S. southern yellow pines. Based on these shortcomings, following
studies should be recommended in the future course of action.
• An extended strategic trade policy model incorporating option B of SLA 2006. The
provinces which follow option B of the agreement represent around 20% of average
monthly lumber exports to the U.S.
• Modeling the U.S.- Canada softwood lumber trade under oligopoly and oligopsony
frameworks. The oligopoly and oligopsony models capture the other lumber trading
partners of the U.S. and Canada, and the influences of those partners on the Canadian
lumber shipments to the U.S. could be easily examined.
• A differentiated product model of the softwood lumber trade. The differential product
model considers the different quality of softwood lumber and lumber prices in the two
countries.
• Does the framing lumber composite price index represent the overall benchmark price
for softwood lumber in the U.S. and Canada? The ineffectiveness of SLA 2006 might
be that the framing lumber composite price doesn’t reflect the entire softwood lumber
market in the U.S. and Canada. Hence, it is worthwhile to investigate the cointe-
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where πxt = 0. Using the Cramer’s rule,
dx =








Then, using (4.5), (4.7) and (4.9) and (π∗yt < 0)
xt ≡ dx/dt = πxyπ∗yt/D > 0
and
yt ≡ dy/dt = −πxxπ∗yt/D < 0
79
Appendix B
Determination of the Optimal Export Tax
The consumer surplus (CS) in the U.S. is the area under the linear demand curve,







































, and P (0) = a is a Choke-off (reservation) price with
quantity demanded equal to zero.













Now the total U.S. social welfare, G(US) is:










































Solving equation (B.4) to derive the optimal export tax t∗ results in:
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